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Abstract
Although research on emotional intelligence (EI) and Cluster B personality traits has
considerable potential for elucidating aspects of the emotional and interpersonal difficulties
experienced by individuals with elevations on these traits, the findings to date have been mixed.
The purpose of this study was to use an experimental manipulation to examine the pattern of
associations between both trait and ability EI and Cluster B disorders, to test whether individuals
could fake their EI via self-report versus maximum performance tests to appear more socially
desirable, as well as to explore the pattern of associations between EI and Cluster B disorders,
after accounting for the capacity to fake EI and social desirability. The results showed that a)
antisocial personality disorder traits, borderline personality disorder traits, and narcissistic
personality disorder traits were negatively correlated with EI; b) participants could fake their trait
EI responses, bit not their ability EI responses, when motivated to do so; c) only honest trait EI
scores predicted faked trait EI scores, but honest ability EI scores and impression management
predicted faked ability EI scores; and d) after accounting for variance from faking, EI was
negatively associated with antisocial, borderline, and narcissistic personality disorder traits. EI
was found to be a core feature of Cluster B disorders, and as such, offers a multitude of
implications for everyday situations, clinical settings, and future research.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The current wave of interest in Emotional Intelligence (EI) in fields of social and clinical
psychology beginning began in earnest in the 1990s, but has roots reaching back to the 1920s
(Bar-On, 2006). Various models and ways of conceptualizing EI have been developed in recent
years and, with them, a wide range of implications have been discerned. Regardless of model,
research has shown EI to be associated with successful and close interpersonal relationships, as
well as various other outcomes, such as workplace and school success, physical health, selfactualization, self-perceived wellbeing, psychological health, and emotional functioning (BarOn, 2006; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2008). As such, it is perhaps unsurprising that researchers
have begun to turn their attention to the relationship between EI and Cluster B personality
disorders, the latter of which is characterized by dramatic and erratic behaviour as well as
emotion dysregulation (APA, 2013). Although there are theoretical and clinical features that
overlap (as will be made clear in the review that follows), this nascent literature is characterized
by mixed findings. The objective of the current study was to add to the literature by replicating
two key studies within a single integrated study and, importantly, extending this research by
investigating the vulnerability of two distinct approaches to measuring EI (trait vs. ability
models) to ‘faking’ (that is, deliberately misrepresenting one’s EI for the purposes of making
oneself appear in a more positive light) as a function of Cluster B personality traits. It is the
nature of the Cluster B set of personality traits (rather than other adaptive or maladaptive
personality traits) that renders them of particular interest here, given that emotional dysregulation
and related deficits are considered core to them and also that social desirability response biases
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(here, responding to questionnaire items in a manner intended to create a positive impression and
perhaps also reflective of self-deception about one’s positive and negative attributes) might be
particularly pronounced among those with elevated Cluster B traits. This vulnerability issue is of
central importance, with both theoretical and applied implications, raising as it does the question
of measurement validity. As such, the potential contributions of the current study are
considerable.
Emotional Intelligence (EI)
Emotional intelligence (EI) is a construct that refers to the ability to monitor and
understand one’s own, as well as others’, emotions (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). This information
can then be used to guide behaviour and regulate emotions. EI has implications for oneself, but it
also has implications for relationships and interactions with others. EI encompasses assessing
and expressing one’s own emotions, verbally and non-verbally. EI also includes the perception
of others’ emotions and the ability to respond empathically to them. Another component of EI is
emotion regulation, in oneself and of others. Individuals with high levels of EI have awareness
that allows them to be attentive to how they are feeling, as well as how others are feeling, and to
respond appropriately (Cherniss, Extein, Goleman, & Weissberg, 2006; Salovey & Mayer,
1990). The company of these individuals has been reported as more pleasant by others and likely
to elevate others’ moods (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). It follows that deficits in EI can lead to
interpersonal difficulties. Salovey and Mayer (1990) suggest that EI is an adaptive mechanism
that helps individuals achieve their goals.
EI is a separate construct from IQ and has been linked to various life outcomes, including
better mental health (Petrides, 2011), more successful and satisfying relationships (Schutte et al.,
2001), and higher performance in academic and workplace settings (Bar-On, 2006; Caruso,
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Mayer, & Salovey, 2002; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004). Definitions of EI, generally
encompass perception, understanding, regulation, and use of emotions (Ciarrochi, Chan, &
Caputi, 2000). As the conceptualization of EI is still developing, there exist multiple differing
constructs (Cherniss et al., 2006), two of which, however, appear to be prominent in the EI
literature: trait EI and ability EI (Petrides, 2011). The distinction between these two can be
productively discussed, first, by considering their fundamental differences and then by reviewing
the manner in which each have been operationalized and measured in the empirical literature.
Trait Emotional Intelligence vs. Ability Emotional Intelligence
Despite the presence of the word ‘intelligence,’ rather than being construed as a cognitive
ability (or set of cognitive abilities), trait EI has been viewed in the same sort of vein as
personality traits, with the trait part reflecting the view that EI is stable across environments and
situations (Bar-On, 2006; Petrides & Furnham, 2000; Petrides, Furnham, & Mavroveli, 2007). It
is also known as emotional self-efficacy (Petrides et al., 2007) or a “mixed model” of EI (Caruso
et al., 2002). Trait EI is comparable to social intelligence, as it relates to the understanding and
management of one’s own, as well as others’ emotions (De Raad, 2005; Salovey & Mayer,
1990). Trait EI is based on how individuals subjectively see themselves, and thus, is measured
through self-report questionnaires. Items from these questionnaires tend to ask how the
individual behaves and feels on a regular basis, and taps into constructs, such as empathy,
optimism, and impulsivity, as well as motivation, self-awareness, and happiness (Petrides &
Furnham, 2000). Trait EI is not related to intelligence (Bar-On, Tranel, Denburg, & Bechara,
2003; Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Brackett & Salovey, 2006; Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998;
Derksen, Kramer, & Katzko, 2002; O’Connor & Little, 2003; Roberts, MacCann, Matthews, &
Zeidner, 2010), but it is highly correlated with personality traits, such as the Big 5 (De Raad,
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2005; Grubb & McDaniel, 2007; O’Connor & Little, 2003; Petrides & Furnham, 2003; Van der
Linden, Tsaousis, & Petrides, 2012). More specifically, there is significant overlap between trait
EI and the Neuroticism (i.e., emotional stability) and Extraversion facets of personality
(MacCann, Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2003; Tett, Fox, & Wang, 2005), as well as the
agreeableness factor (De Raad, 2005; Tett et al., 2005).
Although trait EI is closely related to personality and is considered by some as a lowerlevel personality dimension, it remains a unique construct (Cherniss et al., 2006; Petrides et al.,
2007; Tett et al., 2005). According to Cherniss et al. (2006), various studies have demonstrated
effects of EI that are separate from personality, despite associations between trait EI and
personality. For example, Law, Wong, and Song (2004) found that although EI was related to
personality traits and the Big 5, EI and personality, together, predicted life satisfaction better
than personality alone. Also, EI accounted for additional variance in determining life satisfaction
and feelings of powerlessness, as well as prediction of job performance ratings, when variance
from the Big 5 was controlled for. Similarly, Petrides et al. (2007) sought to locate trait EI within
the context of existing personality factors. Using a regression analysis, the researchers
successfully isolated trait EI from existing personality factors, demonstrating that it accounted
for unique variance in predicting life satisfaction, emotional control, and coping, despite
correlating with the Giant Three and Big Five personality factors. Thus, despite overlap between
trait EI and Big Five traits, there exists theoretical and explanatory utility in trait EI (Petrides &
Furnham, 2001).
The ability EI perspective, on the other hand, maintains that EI is an “actual intelligence”
(Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2001) and argues that EI is a model of information
processing (Petrides & Furnham, 2000). It is viewed as a combination of intelligence and

4

emotion (Mayer et al., 2004): a cognitive capability focusing on the use of emotional information
that is gathered (Mayer et al., 2001). Ability EI is concerned with using emotional information to
aid processes like reasoning. According to Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey (1999), there are three
criteria that a construct should meet to be considered an intelligence, and they concluded that
ability EI meets all three: it must reflect mental performance, it should be similar to, but distinct
from, already-existing intelligences, and it must develop with time. On the basis of this
conceptualization, Mayer et al. (2000) developed a measure, the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso
Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT), for which responses could be evaluated for correctness,
and found that ability EI correlated with verbal intelligence. Construed as a cognitive ability,
ability EI is measured using maximum performance tests, in which the items have objectively
correct and incorrect answers. As opposed to responses being based on subjective, retrospective
opinion of the self, the MSCEIT items consist of tasks or problems that respondents are required
to solve. Responses or answers to these tasks are then evaluated for correctness using
standardized data and expert criteria (Mayer et al., 2003). Mayer et al. (1999) also found that
adults’ ability EI scores were significantly higher than those of adolescents, which might reflect
developmental differences in the acquisition and maturation of ability EI.
Not only is ability EI related to intelligence, it is also related to personality, but not as
strongly as trait EI (Bastian, Burns, & Nettelbeck, 2005). Although ability EI is related to both
personality and intelligence, it remains distinct from both, correlating to a small degree with
prosocial personality traits and knowledge-based intelligence measures (MacCann et al., 2003).
Bastian et al. (2005) found that ability EI was associated with agreeableness and openness, while
also correlating with knowledge. Consistent with these findings, Farrelly and Austin (2007)
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found that ability EI is related to crystallized knowledge (i.e., use of knowledge to problem
solve), as opposed to fluid intelligence.
Measures of EI
There are various measures of EI that are currently in use by researchers. There are four
widely used measures of trait EI: the Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i; Bar-On, 1997), the
Trait Meta Mood Scale (TMMS; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995), the Trait
Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire (TEIQue; Petrides, 2009b), and the Schutte Self-Report
Emotional Intelligence Test (SSEIT; Schutte et al., 1998). They are all self-report questionnaires.
The EQ-i subscales assess one’s capability to recognize, and be aware of and understand one’s
own emotions (i.e., intrapersonal subscale), as well as those of others (i.e., interpersonal
subscale; Dawda & Hart, 2000). It also encompasses the extent to which one can identify
problems and adjust emotions to specific situations (i.e., adaptability subscale), having impulse
control and the ability to cope with stressful events (i.e., stress management subscale), and one’s
general mood (i.e., mood subscale). Research by its developers and independent researchers have
reported sound psychometric properties (e.g., Dawda & Hart, 2000). See Figure 1 for a visual
depiction of the EQ-i model.
Similarly, the TMMS measures perceives emotional intelligence through self-report items
that address one’s reflective mood experience (Extremera & Fernandez-Berrocal, 2005). It
measures individuals’ beliefs about their own emotional attention (i.e., consideration given to
own emotional status), clarity (i.e., understanding of emotions), and repair (i.e., ability to
regulate emotions). The TEIQue has 15 facets that, like the other trait EI measures, assess
characteristics such as emotion expression, management, perception, and regulation (Petrides,
2009a). Finally, the SSEIT is a one-dimensional measure of trait EI (Petrides & Furnham, 2000).
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Petrides and Furnham (2000) advise against using this measure, however, as, although they
found face, construct, predictive, and discriminant validity, they also found it to be
multidimensional and to not represent only one general EI factor, as conceptualized.
Unlike trait EI, ability EI is consistently measured throughout the literature by only one
measure: the Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT). The MSCEIT is a
measure of EI as a cognitive ability and contains items that have correct and incorrect responses
(Brackett & Salovey, 2006). It measures four branches of EI: perceiving emotions, using
emotions to facilitate thought, understanding emotions, and managing emotions (Caruso et al.,
2002; Mayer et al., 1999). Perceiving emotions encompasses being aware of emotions and being
able to differentiate between real and fake emotions. Using emotions to facilitate thought refers
to redirecting emotions, enabling decision making, considering multiple perspectives, and
encouraging multiple methods of problem solving. Understanding emotions concerns the ability
to comprehend complex emotions and how emotions can transition into one another, as well as
the ability to distinguish the cause of emotions and the relationships among them. Finally,
managing emotions refers to the ability to determine the nature of emotions and to express the
appropriate emotion(s) based on the situation. Brackett and Salovey (2006) found the MSCEIT
to be a reliable and valid measure of EI as a mental ability. For a visual depiction of the MSCEIT
model, see Figure 2.
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Figure 1. A visual depiction of the EQ-i trait EI model.
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Figure 2. A visual depiction of the MSCEIT ability EI model.
Implications of EI for Psychological and Social Functioning
Trait EI is associated with various life outcomes (Bar-On, 2006). Importantly, there is a
positive relationship between trait EI and psychological health (Petrides, 2011), which suggests
lower levels of EI are associated with higher levels of psychopathology (Leible & Snell, 2004;
Malterer, Glass, & Newman, 2008). For example, using a longitudinal design, Williams, Daley,
Burnside, and Hammond-Rowley’s (2010) found that low trait EI predicted the development of
psychopathology when transitioning into secondary school. Bar-On (2006) suggested that
perhaps the components of EI that have the greatest impact on psychological health are
management of emotions and coping with stress, drive to accomplish goals and to achieve selfactualization, and verification of emotions, as deficits in these domains may specifically
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contribute to the development of psychopathology. For instance, anxiety may be associated with
difficulties managing emotions, while depression may be related to the inability to reach selfactualization, and dissociation from reality may be linked to difficulties with verifying emotions.
Additionally, Santesso, Reker, Schmidt, and Segalowitz (2006) reported that higher levels of trait
EI were associated with less aggressive and fewer delinquent behaviours. Santesso et al. (2006)
found that externalizing behaviours were related to lower levels of the interpersonal, stress
management, and adaptability components of trait EI. The authors suggested that this finding
implies that individuals with externalizing issues may have lower levels of empathy and social
responsibility, and may lack impulse control, as well as interpersonal problem solving skills.
Further, Santesso et al. (2006) found that aggression and delinquency were associated with
activation in the right frontal area of the brain. Previous findings by Davidson (2000) support
that this pattern of brain activity is reflective of difficulties regulating emotions, as well as a
tendency towards negative affect and negative emotional responses.
Some researchers have proposed that EI may be a protective factor. Protective factors have
been construed as functioning in a number of ways (see Rutter, 1985). Two fundamental means
through which a protective factor might operate are (i) through a direct effect on an outcome (for
example, the development of psychopathology), making that outcome less likely (as opposed to a
risk factor that would be associated with a higher likelihood of the adverse outcome occurring),
and (ii) through an interaction effect, reducing the association between a risk factor and the
adverse outcome (Langton & Worling, 2015).
In the literature regarding EI, Mikolajczak, Petrides, and Hurry (2009) found that low trait EI
predicted likelihood of self-harm, and they suggested that high levels of trait EI might be
considered a protective factor against self-harm. Parker, Taylor, and Bagby (2001) investigated
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trait EI and alexithymia, which they showed to be highly related constructs. Alexithymia consists
of difficulties identifying emotions and distinguishing between emotions and bodily sensations,
difficulty expressing emotions, limited imagination, and having a literal and external way of
thinking (Taylor & Bagby, 2000). Parker et al. (2001) found that individuals with alexithymia
tended to have low EI, especially adaptability and stress management, suggesting that individuals
with alexithymia struggle with coping and regulating emotions. Thus, paired with previous
findings that alexithymia is related to psychiatric disorders, the researchers suggest that their
findings support high trait EI as a protective factor for mental health. Similarly, Grabe, Spitzer,
and Freyberger (2004) found associations between alexithymia and various disorders. They
suggested that difficulties identifying and understanding emotions may cause individuals to
become emotionally confused and unable to react appropriately.
Studies have also shown that trait EI can predict quality of social interactions. For example,
Schutte et al. (2001) found that individuals with higher levels of trait EI were more likely to have
better social skills (e.g., social and emotional control, social and emotional sensitivity, and social
and emotional expressivity), were more cooperative, and experienced more feelings of inclusion
and affection from others. Petrides, Sangareau, and Frederickson (2006) also reported that
individuals perceived peers with higher levels of EI as more cooperative and as having
leadership qualities.
Further, throughout the literature, higher levels of trait EI have been associated with higher
levels of performance (Bar-On, 2006). Higher levels of trait EI have been associated with
academic success (Parker, Summerfeldt, Hogan, & Majeski, 2004), as well as success in the
workplace (Petrides & Furnham, 2006). Moreover, the use of self-awareness, and emotion and
stress management to solve problems within oneself and interpersonally are related to positive
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health outcomes, as well as an optimistic disposition (Bar-On, 2006; Petrides, 2011). For
example, Mavroveli, Petrides, Rieffe, and Bakker (2007) found that higher levels of trait EI were
associated with fewer somatic symptoms, and Tsaousis and Nikolaou (2005) found that high
levels of EI were associated with good physical health. Interestingly, trait EI is a construct that
appears to be amenable to interventions intended to enhance it, to some extent (Bar-On, 2006;
Dunkley, 1996; Freedman, 2003). Nelis, Quoidbach, Mikolajczak, and Hansenne (2009) reported
improvement specifically in the domains of identifying and managing emotions, but no change in
understanding of emotions. In a later extension of this study, Nelis et al. (2011) showed that
emotion regulation, understanding of emotion, and overall EI could all be improved, and this, in
turn, resulted in more positive life outcomes (i.e., improved psychological wellbeing, health, and
quality of social relationships, as well as employability). Various researchers, however, have
suggested limitations of studies supporting the improvement of trait EI. Groves, McEnrue, and
Shen (2008) suggest that future studies may benefit from a more objective measure of EI than
self-report measures, to ensure an actual change in behaviour. Kotsou, Nelis, Grégoire, and
Mikolajczak (2011) similarly suggested that future research on the improvement of EI could
benefit from the use of objective EI measures, as well as comparing the effects of individual
differences, and examination of biological or neural changes.
Ability EI is also associated with numerous positive life outcomes (Mayer, Salovey, &
Caruso, 2008). Higher levels of ability EI, especially managing emotions, tend to be indicative of
more prosocial behaviours (Lopes, Salovey, & Straus, 2003; Mayer et al., 2004). Individuals
with higher levels of ability EI tend to be more open and agreeable, and are more likely to be
employed in a position that involves considerable social interactions (e.g., teacher, counsellor;
Mayer et al., 2004). Additionally, the quality of social interactions appears to be better for
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individuals with higher levels of ability EI, and these individuals tend to be liked and valued
more than those with lower levels of ability EI. Further, individuals with lower levels of ability
EI have been linked to increased deviant behaviour, as well as engagement in substance use
(Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Brackett, Mayer, & Warner, 2004; Mayer et al., 2004). Like trait EI,
ability EI has been associated with lower levels of psychopathology (Brackett, Rivers, &
Salovey, 2011). Lower levels of ability EI have been coupled with disorders such as depression,
anxiety, and schizophrenia.
Higher levels of ability EI has also been found to lead to academic success, as well as
leadership and job performance (Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Mayer et al., 2004). More specifically,
Rosete and Ciarrochi (2005) found that executives who have higher levels of EI are more likely
to be considered effective leaders, as well as to achieve workplace goals. EI is thought to help
academic performance in the sense that it helps students prioritize thinking and manage emotions
in high-stress situations (Brackett et al., 2011). Of note, it is possible to improve one’s ability EI,
especially the understanding and managing emotions abilities (Pool & Qualter, 2012).
Faking by Participants in EI Research
The validity and reliability of EI as a construct, as well as its measures, has been
questioned by numerous researchers (e.g., Christiansen, Janovics, & Siers, 2010; Day & Carroll,
2008; Tett, Freund, Christiansen, Fox, & Coaster, 2012; Whitman, Rooy, Viswesvaran, &
Alonso, 2008). More specifically, faking responses on EI measures is a concern. Faking refers to
the conscious effort to depict oneself in a favourable light by responding to items in a way that
minimize faults and overstate positive qualities (Komar, Brown, Komar, & Robie, 2008; Tett et
al., 2012). From Paulhus’s (1984) perspective, this is a form of impression management and
needs to be controlled for when using self-report measures. This appears to be more of an issue
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with measures of trait EI and various personality and non-cognitive ability tests that have already
been shown to be vulnerable to faked responses (Roberts et al., 2010). For example, metaanalytic work conducted by Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, Brannick, and Smith (2006)
confirmed that responses by individuals who were instructed to fake responses to appear more
desirable for an employment position (e.g., job applicant vs. nonapplicant condition) were more
likely to produce a personality profile that reflected positively on them. Such vulnerability to
faking has negative implications for the predictive validity and construct validity of these types
of measures (Griffin, Hesketh, & Grayson, 2004).
With regards to EI, Grubb and McDaniel (2007) sought to establish the potential to fake
on the Emotional Quotient Inventory Short Form (EQ-i:S). They did so by asking participants to
respond once to the measures honestly and then again in a way the participants thought would
ensure they would be hired for an imaginary job. The researchers found that participants were
able to positively exaggerate their trait EI scores. In addition, cognitive ability and agreeableness
predicted how well participants could do this. The researchers proposed that individuals with
higher cognitive abilities may have been better able to recognize opportunities to make
themselves appear more favourable on the basis of responses to items on the measure. The
researchers also suggested that perhaps higher levels of agreeableness meant these individuals
were more likely to follow the instructions given by the experimenter.
Day and Carroll (2008) extended this line of research by testing both an ability EI
measure, the MSCEIT, and a trait EI measure, the EQ-i, for susceptibility to faking. Based on the
overlap between trait EI measures and personality measures, which have been shown to be
vulnerable to faking, Day and Carroll (2008) predicted that participants would be able to fake
responses on the EQ-i, but not on the MSCEIT. The researchers created two conditions: the
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applicant condition and the non-applicant condition. In the applicant condition, the participants
were presented with a fictional Peer Counsellor job description and were asked to complete the
measures as though they were applying for the job. Cash rewards were offered to increase
incentive to enhance responses. In the non-applicant condition, the participants were told to
complete the measures in an honest manner. All participants completed both conditions. The
researchers found that the EQ-i was more vulnerable to faking than the MSCEIT, as participants
were able to enhance their EQ-i scores in the applicant condition, but not their MSCEIT scores.
It should be clear that if trait EI responses can be faked, social desirability response bias may be
obscuring the associations between trait EI and various correlates and outcomes in studies (for a
summary of methods used in motivated faking studies, see Table 1). Given these results, for the
current investigation, it seemed reasonable to expect that individuals would be able to fake their
EI scores and also that socially desirable responding would predict faked EI scores (in prediction
models including honest EI scores). Further, it seemed important to incorporate personality traits
for which EI would appear to be a centrally important construct and which may be strongly
associated with social desirability response biases.
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Table 1
Summary of Methods in Motivated and Instructed Faking Studies of EI
Grubb &
McDaniel (2007)

Day & Carroll
(2008)

Choi et al.
(2011)

Hartman &
Grubb (2011)

Tett et al. (2012)

Purpose

To explore the
extent to which one
can fake responses
on the EQ-i

To compare the
susceptibility of the
EQ-i and the
MSCEIT to faking.

To test the
susceptibility of
two trait EI
measures to
socially desirable
responding.

To examine the
extent to which
personality traits
and EI can be faked.

To explore the effects
of cognitive ability,
opportunity, and job
relevance to faking.

Design

The participants
completed selfreport
questionnaires on
two separate
occasions. One
occasion was the
faking condition
and the other was
the honest
responding
condition. The
order in which they
completed the
faking and honest
conditions was
randomized.
The participants
were able to elevate
their EI scores in
the faking
condition.

The participants
completed both the
faking and the
honest responding
conditions. They
completed the
measures as though
they were an
applicant for a job
first. They then
returned two weeks
later to complete the
measures honestly.

Half of the
participants
completed the
measures
honestly, a quarter
were randomly
assigned to a
motivated faking
condition in
which they were
to imagine they
are university
applicants, and a
quarter were
explicitly
instructed to fake.

All participants
completed the
measures in both the
honest and faking
conditions in a
randomized order.

Participants completed
the measures honestly
first, and then under the
motivated faking
condition. In the
motivated faking
condition, they were
asked to imagine they
were applying to be a
nurse practitioner,
marketing manager, or
computer programmer.

Participants were
able to elevate EQ-i
scores, but not
MSCEIT scores in
the faking
condition.

Individuals were
able to enhance
their responses
when motivated
and instructed to
do so.

Faking personality
traits and EI was
possible in the
faking conditions.

Faking effects were
more likely to be
present in individuals
with higher intelligence
and who scored lower
on the measures in the
honest responding
condition.

Findings

Note. EQ-i = Emotional Quotient Inventory; MSCEIT = Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional
Intelligence Test

Cluster B Personality Disorder Traits and EI
In terms of psychopathology, personality disorders refer to a pattern of cognition, affect,
interpersonal functioning, and/or impulse control that depart significantly from the norms and
expectations of society (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). There are four personality
disorders that all share core features associated with dramatic and impulsive tendencies, which
appear in adolescence or early adulthood, and which are associated with significant emotional
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and interpersonal distress for the individual and/or those around them. These personality
disorders form a set, referred to as Cluster B personality disorders and are, at their core,
characterized by erratic and dramatic features and emotion dysregulation (APA, 2013).
Individuals with these personality disorders have rigid and maladaptive ways of interacting with
others and various negative behaviours are associated with the Cluster B personality traits, such
as self-harm (Brent et al., 1994; Casilas & Clark, 2002; Klonsky, Oltmanns, & Turkheimer,
2003), aggression (e.g., McGirr, Paris, Lesage, Renaud, & Turecki, 2007), and substance abuse
(Trull, Waudby, & Sher, 2004). Not only can these personality disorders be significantly
distressing for the individual and/or those with whom they come into contact, they create an
economic burden on society (Soeteman, Hakkaart-van Roijen, Verheul, & Busschbach, 2008).
Cluster B traits are associated with absences from work, as well as inpatient and outpatient
healthcare. In addition, the Cluster B personality disorders have implications for the justice
system, in which, individuals with antisocial, borderline, histrionic, and narcissistic personality
disorders are overrepresented (Fazel & Danesh, 2002; Warren & South, 2009), and are at higher
risk to reoffend than individuals involved in the justice system who do not meet criteria for these
personality disorders (Hiscoke, Langström, Ottosson, & Grann., 2003).
Researchers have investigated purported associations between EI and Cluster B
personality traits, due to the overlap in the domain of emotion dysregulation and characteristics
that affect interpersonal relationships (Gardner & Qualter, 2009; Leible & Snell, 2004; Petrides,
Vernon, Schermer, & Veselka, 2011; Ruiz, Salazar, & Caballo, 2012; Sinclair & Feigenbaum,
2012; Webb & McMurran, 2008). Findings have been mixed, however, and among the studies
with demonstrated associations, the lack of consistency in terms of study design and
methodology, as well as findings is perhaps the most noteworthy feature.
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Many of these studies have used non-clinical (Gardner & Qualter, 2009; Leible & Snell,
2004; Sinclair & Feigenbaum, 2012) and non-forensic samples (Fix & Fix, 2015; Petrides,
Vernon, Schermer, & Veselka, 2011). Although subclinical levels of Cluster B personality
disorder traits may not be as extreme as clinical or forensic manifestations, use of samples with
such subclinical levels may be more representative of the general population (Gardner & Qualter,
2009). In any case, studies have found that individuals with scores on measures of Cluster B
traits below clinical thresholds also experience dysfunction in various domains of their lives
(Trull, Useda, Conforti, & Doan, 1997).
Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD). An individual with ASPD is considered to
have an antisocial and criminal personality (Kraus & Reynolds, 2001). Individuals with
antisocial personality traits are described as impulsive and irresponsible; they often violate social
norms or break the law, and disregard the rights of others, engaging in both physical and
relational aggression (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Over the lifespan, these
individuals tend to be deceitful and often manipulate and mistreat others for their own gain or
amusement. They feel little to no remorse for their actions. Kraus and Reynolds (2001) suggested
that perhaps it is their deceitfulness that makes individuals with ASPD traits difficult to
diagnose. Additionally, not only are individuals with ASPD traits at a higher risk of having a
comorbid disorder, up to 10% of individuals with ASPD have a higher risk of suicide (Kraus &
Reynolds, 2001).
Although psychopathy and ASPD are related constructs, they are distinct from one
another and the current study does not include psychopathy. Although psychopathy is not
considered a personality disorder (and is not a formal diagnosis), it is characterized by
callousness, lack of remorse, limited affect, arrogance, deceitfulness, impulsivity,
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irresponsibility, and consistent antisocial behaviours (Neumann, Hare, & Pardini, 2015). Of note,
many individuals with elevated psychopathic traits meet the criteria for ASPD, but most
individuals with ASPD would not meet the criteria for psychopathy (Hare, 1996). Further,
researchers have shown that individuals with elevated psychopathic traits have highly distinct
patterns of performance on cognitive and affective tasks (e.g., Patrick, 1994; Williamson,
Harpur, & Hare, 1991). For example, individuals meeting criteria for psychopathy have been
shown to be less able to process or use deep contextual meanings of language or to demonstrate
normative awareness of the emotional significance of life experiences.
There are few known studies focused on the relationship between EI and ASPD.
Furthermore, the available literature is mixed. Leible and Snell (2004) found a negative
correlation between ASPD traits and indices of emotional understanding and regulation. Ruiz et
al. (2012) conducted a replication of the Leible and Snell (2004) study, but reported inconsistent
results. Ruiz et al. (2012) found a positive correlation between ASPD traits and emotional
awareness, but no other significant correlations between ASPD and EI components (see Table 2
for further details). No studies examining the relationship between ASPD traits and components
of EI, as operationalized and measured by the EQ-i or the MSCEIT, have been conducted to
date.
Although the nature of the relationship between ASPD and EI is unclear, various aspects
of EI do appear to have implications for individuals with ASPD. For example, Davidson,
Putnam, and Larson (2000) highlight the importance of emotion regulation in inhibiting
aggressive behaviour. The more effectively individuals are able to control their emotions, as well
as correctly perceive cues from others (e.g., verbal and non-verbal signs of anger or fear), the
less emotionally reactive they are likely to be, and therefore, the less likely they may be to act
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aggressively. Roberton, Daffern, and Bucks’s (2012) study highlighted the importance of the role
emotion regulation plays in the occurrence of aggressive behaviour. Roberton et al. (2012) found
that aggressive behaviour was more prevalent in individuals who were unable to regulate their
negative emotions (e.g., anger, anxiety), as well as in individuals who tended to overregulate
their negative emotions. Individuals who overregulate their emotions appeared to be aggressive
due to denial of negative emotions or difficulty expressing them. Velotti et al. (2016) also found
results consistent with these findings in individuals with alexithymia. They reported that
individuals who were unable to recognize and understand their emotions were more likely to act
in an aggressive manner. These findings suggest that a deficit in EI could be a contributing factor
in aggressive behaviour exhibited by individuals with ASPD. Thus, based on findings from
previous studies, for the current study, it was hypothesized that lower EI scores would be
associated with higher ASPD trait scores.
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Table 2
Summary of Key Findings Regarding the Relationship between ASPD and EI
Study
Sample

Leible & Snell (2004)

Ruiz et al. (2012)

1418 university students (810 females and
566 males)

Measures

1) Trait Meta-Mood Scale
2) Multidimensional Emotional Awareness
Questionnaire
3) Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire-4+
Participants completed the self-report
questionnaires in one 50-55 minute sitting.
1) ASPD was negatively correlated with
emotional clarity
2) ASPD was negatively correlated with
emotional repair
3) ASPD was negatively correlated with
emotional attention.
4) ASPD was negatively correlated with
private emotional attention
5) ASPD was negative correlated with
private emotional preoccupation

354 participants – mix of university students and
members of the community (252 females and 94
males)
1) Personality exploratory questionnaire-III
2) Trait Meta Mood Scale
3) Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale

Study Design
Main Findings

Participants completed the self-report
questionnaires in one 50 to 65 minute sitting.
1) ASPD was not correlated with emotional
clarity
2) ASPD was not correlated with emotional
repair
3) ASPD was positively correlated with
emotional attention

Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). Individuals with BPD traits endure a great deal
of suffering and experience intense deficiencies in controlling emotion and impulses, as well as
coping with negative emotions (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). BPD is characterized
by desperate efforts to prevent real or perceived abandonment, unstable social relationships,
disruption in identity, emotional instability, negative affect, expressions of anger at inappropriate
times, paranoid ideation, and persistent suicidal behaviour. These individuals are constantly in a
state of catastrophe and tend to have contradictory beliefs, affect, and behaviour (Kraus &
Reynolds, 2001). Self-harming and self-destructive behaviours are characteristic of individuals
with BPD traits.
Researchers have reported that higher levels of BPD traits tend to be associated with
lower levels of total EI (Gardner & Qualter, 2009; Leible & Snell, 2004; Ruiz et al., 2012;
Sinclaire et al., 2012). More specifically, researchers have found that higher levels of BPD traits
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were related to more difficulty understanding emotions (Gardner & Qualter, 2009; Leible &
Snell, 2004; Ruiz et al., 2012). They have also shown that individuals who reported higher levels
of BPD traits tended to have more difficulties regulating emotions (Gardner & Qualter, 2009;
Leible & Snell, 2004; Ruiz et al., 2012; Sinclaire et al., 2012). Further, Ruiz et al. (2012) found
that individuals higher in BPD traits tended to pay more attention to their emotions. Although
one study has examined this relationship using the EQ-i, the researchers did not find statistically
significant associations (Webb et al., 2008). See Table 3 for a summary of other key findings.
Researchers have postulated that EI may play a variety of important roles among those
who develop personality disorders. Gardner and Qualter (2009) proposed that low EI could be a
potential risk factor in developing poor emotional skills and, as a result, developing maladaptive
borderline traits. Similarly, Petrides et al. (2011) labelled high EI as a buffer against the genetic
and environmental factors that contribute to the development of antisocial traits. Moreover,
Leible and Snell (2004) proposed that a treatment focus of emotional development may be
beneficial in improving outcomes for individuals with elevated Cluster B traits. Moreover,
Sinclair and Feigenbaum (2012) also believe EI training could contribute positively to treatment
of BPD. This has already been observed in individuals with BPD who participate in Dialectical
Behaviour Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993). For example, Goodman et al. (2014) found an
improvement in emotion regulation and a decrease in amygdala hyperactivity in individuals with
BPD who underwent DBT for 12 months. In addition, Sinclair and Feigenbaum (2012) also
proposed that EI scores may be helpful in assessing BPD traits in clinical settings. As such, for
the current study, it was predicted that lower EI scores would be significantly associated with
higher BPD trait scores.
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Table 3
Summary of Key Findings Regarding the Relationship between BPD and EI
Study

Leible & Snell (2004)

Ruiz et al. (2012)

Webb et al.
(2008)

Gardner & Qualter
(2009)

Sinclair &
Feigenbaum (2012)

Sample

1418 university students
(810 females and 566
males)

134 undergraduate
students

523 – mix of
community members
and university students

72 participants – clinical
sample

Measures

1) PDQ-4+
2) Trait Meta-Mood Scale
3) Multidimensional
Emotional Awareness
Questionnaire

1) EQi: S
2) TAS-20
3) Personality
Assessment
Inventory

1) Schutte EI Scale
2) MSCEIT
3) Items from multiple
BPD questionnaires

1) TEIQue
2) Borderline Evaluation
of Severity over Time
3) Difficulties in Emotion
Regulation Scale
4) Five Facet Mindfulness
Questionnaire

Study Design

Participants completed the
self-report questionnaires
in one 50-55 minute sitting.

Participants completed
the self-report
questionnaires online.

Participants completed
the self-report
questionnaires online.

The measures were mailed
to the participants.

Main
Findings

1) BPD negatively
correlated with
emotional clarity
2) BPD negatively
correlated with
emotional repair

354 participants – mix
of university students
and members of the
community (252
females and 94 males)
1) Personality
exploratory
questionnaire-III
2) Trait Meta Mood
Scale
3) Difficulties in
Emotion Regulation
Scale
Participants completed
the self-report
questionnaires in one
50 to 65 minute sitting.
1) BPD was negatively
correlated with
emotional clarity
2) BPD was negatively
correlated with
emotional repair
3) BPD was positively
correlated with
emotional attention

1) Correlations with trait
EI were negative and
moderate
2) Poor emotion
management was
related to higher BPD
traits

1) Low trait EI was
associated with more
severe borderline traits
2) Low trait EI was
associated with
difficulties in emotion
regulation

EI failed to predict
BPD traits.

Note. PDQ – 4+ = Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire-4+; EQ-i:S = Emotional Quotient Inverntory: Short
Version; TAS-20 = Toronto Alexithymia Scale; MSCEIT = Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test;
TEQue = Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire.

Histrionic Personality Disorder (HPD). HPD is characterized by a pattern involving
exaggerated expression of shallow emotions and attention-seeking behaviours (APA, 2013).
Individuals with HPD traits feel uncomfortable if they are not the center of attention and tend to
be dramatic. They also tend to be overly offended by critical comments. They go to excessive
lengths to be the center of attention by engaging in behaviours, such as spending large amounts
of money and time, or making up stories. Individuals with HPD need affection, are egocentric,
seductive, and engage in obviously manipulative behaviours. Further, individuals with HPD
traits can either be exhibitionists or they may be more timid and reserved (Kraus & Reynolds,
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2001). Individuals with HPD traits who also exhibit shyness still want attention but are more
concerned with appearing too excited or difficult to manage.
There is limited available research on the link between HPD traits and EI, and findings
reported have been mixed in terms of the direction of the relationship between HPD traits and
components of EI. Consistent across the few published studies is the finding that individuals with
higher levels of HPD traits are more likely to pay attention to their emotions. However, Leible
and Snell (2004) found that individuals with higher levels of HPD traits tended to have lower
levels of emotional understanding; in their study, they found no relationship between HPD traits
and emotional regulation. In contrast, Ruiz et al. (2012) found that individuals with higher levels
of HPD traits tended to be able to understand their own emotions, as well as regulate them. No
studies examining the relationship between HPD traits and components of EI, as operationalized
and measured by the EQ-i or the MSCEIT, have been conducted to date. See Table 4 for a
comparison of more detailed results. In accordance with Leible and Snell’s (2004) findings, for
the current study, it was hypothesized that lower EI scores would be associated with higher HPD
trait scores.
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Table 4
Summary of Key Findings Regarding the Relationship between HPD and EI
Study
Sample

Leible & Snell (2004)

Ruiz et al. (2012)

1418 university students (810 females and 566 males)

354 participants – mix of university students and members
of the community (252 females and 94 males)

Measures

1) PDQ-4+
2) Trait Meta-Mood Scale
3) Multidimensional Emotional Awareness
Questionnaire
Participants completed the self-report questionnaires in
one 50-55 minute sitting.
1) HPD was negatively correlated with emotional
clarity
2) There was no correlation between HPD traits and
emotional repair
3) HPD traits were positively correlated with emotional
attention
4) HPD traits were positively correlated with private
emotional attention
5) HPD traits were negatively correlated with private
emotional preoccupation
6) HPD traits were positively correlated with emotional
awareness in public

1) Personality exploratory questionnaire-III
2) Trait Meta Mood Scale
3) Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale

Study Design
Main Findings

Participants completed the self-report questionnaires in one
50 to 65 minute sitting.
1) HPD traits were positively correlated with emotional
clarity
2) HPD traits were positively correlated with emotional
repair
3) HPD traits were positively correlated with emotional
attention

Note. PDQ – 4+ = Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire-4+

Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD). Individuals with NPD traits tend to be
entitled, grandiose in reference to their own self-importance, require admiration, and lack
empathy (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). They expect a lot from others and can
become very upset, should others not meet their expectations. These individuals also often fail to
tend to others’ emotional needs and exploit them.
Mixed findings have also emerged from the research focused on NPD traits and EI.
Leible and Snell (2004) found that individuals with NPD traits tended to have difficulties with
understanding and regulating their emotions. Petrides (2009), however, found that high levels of
EI were associated with certain characteristics in individuals with narcissistic traits, such as
being overly self-confident. Petrides, Vernon, Schermer, and Veselka’s (2011) study, exploring
the relationship between the Dark Triad (narcissism, psychopathy, and machiavellianism) and EI,
indicated that individuals with narcissistic traits tended to have higher levels of trait EI, as did
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Nagler, Reiter, Furtner, & Rauthmann (2014). Ruiz et al.’s (2012) findings supported this as
well, as they found that individuals with narcissistic traits tended not only to be aware of their
own emotions, but also to understand their emotions. No studies examining the relationship
between NPD traits and components of EI, as operationalized and measured by the EQ-i or the
MSCEIT, have been conducted to date. See Table 5 for a comparison of more detailed results.
The implications of EI for NPD is somewhat different than for the other Cluster B
disorders. Researchers like Nagler et al. (2014) found that high scores in some domains of EI, in
individuals with NPD, aid them in the manipulation of others; in contrast, low scores on other
domains of EI leave these individuals unempathetic and unable to understand others’ emotions.
Thus, in the presence of NPD, it is both the elevations and the deficits in components of EI that
have implications. Given these findings, for the current study, it was hypothesized that higher EI
scores would be associated with higher NPD trait scores.
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Table 5
Summary of Key Findings Regarding the Relationship between NPD and EI
Study
Sample

Leible & Snell (2004)

Ruiz et al. (2012)

Petrides et al. (2011)

Nagler et al. (2014)

1418 university students
(810 females and 566 males)

214 adult twin pairs: 156
monozygotic (MZ) twin pairs

Two samples were used for this study,
aggregated to one sample (N = 594)

Measures

1) PDQ-4+
2) Trait Meta-Mood Scale
3) Multidimensional
Emotional Awareness
Questionnaire

354 participants – mix of
university students and
members of the community
(252 females and 94
males)
1) Personality exploratory
questionnaire-III
2) Trait Meta Mood Scale
3) Difficulties in Emotion
Regulation Scale

1) Social Skills Inventory
2) Narcissistic Personality Inventory

Study Design

Participants completed the
self-report questionnaires in
one 50-55 minute sitting.

Participants completed the
self-report questionnaires
in one 50 to 65 minute
sitting.

Main Findings

1) NPD traits were
negatively correlated with
emotional clarity
2) NPD traits were
negatively correlated with
emotional repair
3) NPD traits were
negatively correlated with
private emotional
preoccupation
4) NPD traits were
positively correlated with
public emotional
monitoring

1) NPD traits were
positively correlated
with emotional clarity
2) No correlation was
found between NPD
traits and emotional
repair
3) NPD traits were
positively correlated
with emotional
attention

1) Trait Emotional Intelligence
Questionnaire
2) MACH-IV
3) Narcissistic Personality
Inventory (NPI)
4) Self-Report Psychopathy
Scale (SRP-III-R12)
Packages of self-report
questionnaires were mailed to
the participants and they were
asked to complete them
individually.
1) Narcissism correlated
positively with total EI
2) Narcissism showed strongest
positive correlations with
assertiveness, emotion
management, self-esteem,
social awareness, and with
the sociability

Self-report questionnaires

1) Narcissism showed a positive
relationship with socio-emotional
expressivity and control
2) Narcissism had no relationship
with emotional and social
sensitivity
3) Emotional manipulation was
positively associated with
narcissism
4) Narcissism had an interaction
effect on the relationship between
emotional expressivity and
emotional manipulation
5) Narcissism had an interaction
effect on the relationship between
emotional control and emotional
manipulation – higher levels of
narcissism were associated with a
stronger relationship between
emotional control and emotional
manipulation

Note. PDQ – 4+ = Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire-4+; MACH-IV = Machiavellianism Test

Faking on Measures of EI and Personality Disorder Traits
Having noted already that measures of EI are vulnerable to faking, it is important to
consider whether individuals with traits associated with personality disorders might be expected
to misrepresent themselves on these measures in systematic ways or whether elevations or
deficits in components of EI are actually indicative of particular personality profiles.
Researchers have proposed that individuals with antisocial traits may be able to artificially
increase their EI scores for their own advantage (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). This may implicate
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the use of EI in day-to-day manipulations of others for personal gain. Although the positive
implications of EI has been the focus of much research, researchers have proposed a “dark side”
to EI (Bausseron, 2012). For individuals with antisocial traits, Kilduff, Chiaburu, and Menges
(2010) suggested that using emotions to facilitate thought could be translated into focusing on
strategically important targets. For example, employees high in EI are likely to be attentive to the
emotional cues of their supervisors in order to meet or exceed their expectations. Similarly,
supervisors with high EI are likely to be attuned to employees’ emotions when improving their
performance will benefit them or to corroborate their own social status. Managing emotions
could be translated into disguising or expressing emotions for personal gain (e.g., career
advancement, building reputation, improve social status, power, interpersonal control). It could
also be translated into a tendency to attempt to shape others’ emotions and exert strategic control
of emotional information through altering meaning of events and manipulating ambiguous
scenarios. Côté, DeCelles, McCarthy, Van Kleef, and Hideg (2011) found that emotion
regulation can elicit positive outcomes, as well as harmful ones, depending on the individual’s
motives. Similarly, Kahn, Ermer, Salovey, and Kiehl (2016) found that higher levels of EI may
be associated with the ability to manipulate others for self-serving purposes. On the basis of
these interesting findings, the field is greatly in need of investigations of associations between
components of EI and personality disorder traits, in both honest responding and motivated faking
conditions, in order to gain a clearer understanding of whether associations incorporate
deliberate misrepresentation or are better viewed as revealing elevations and depressions in
components of EI that meaningfully reflect the interpersonal and emotional features of these
personality profiles.
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Other Factors Requiring Consideration in EI Work
In the process of researching EI, as well as personality traits, researchers have identified a
number of additional variables that merit consideration. Among these, two are of particular note
for the present study.
Intelligence. As discussed previously, although trait EI is not related to intelligence (BarOn, Tranel, Denburg, & Bechara, 2003; Derksen et al., 2002), ability EI is considered a cognitive
ability and is related to intelligence (MacCann et al., 2003). When using the MSCEIT, multiple
studies also included a measure of cognitive ability in order to account for the overlap between
ability EI and intelligence in associations under investigation (e.g., Ermer, Kahn, Salovey, &
Kiehl, 2012; Kahn et al., 2016).
Gender. Although studies exploring the relationship between Cluster B personality traits
and EI did not explore differences between men and women, studies have found subtle
differences in EI between men and women. For example, Petrides and Furnham (2009) found
that although there was no significant difference in total trait EI, women scored higher on social
skills than men. Abdellatif, Hussien, Hamed, and Zoromba (2017) found that total EI was
slightly higher in women than men, as did Palmer et al. (2012). Further, studies have shown that
men are more likely to enhance their self-presentation and females are more likely to be selfcritical when completing self-report measures (Beyer, 1990, 2002; Petrides & Furnham, 2009).
Present Study
Although research on EI and Cluster B traits appear to have considerable potential for
helping understand aspects of the emotional and interpersonal difficulties experienced by
individuals with elevations on these traits, mixed findings mean further research is clearly
required. The use of two well-validated measures, one each for trait EI and ability EI, with a
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single sample represents an important advance on much of the relevant research, not least
because the two measures selected have not been widely used in investigations of Cluster B
traits, and never together despite their strong psychometric properties. Further, given the
documented vulnerability of measures of trait EI but not ability EI to faking, the importance of
replicating those findings, and extending that work so that associations between trait EI and
ability EI and the Cluster B traits are examined in both honest responding and motivated faking
conditions, will represent a significant contribution to the extant literature.
The purpose of this study is to, first, replicate previous research showing that lower levels
of components of EI are associated with higher trait scores on measures of three of the four
Cluster B personality disorders, while higher levels of EI are associated with higher trait scores
on NPD (all sets of personality traits that, in common, reflect emotional dysfunction and
interpersonal conflict). In addition, for the first time in the literature, associations between these
personality traits and EI will also be investigated using a methodology that accounts for faking
by individuals to appear more socially desirable. As such, the present study has the potential both
to contribute to the understanding of distinct Cluster B personality disorders and also to address a
key question, concerning vulnerability to faking, for distinct approaches to assessing EI.
Hypotheses
Based on the literature, it is hypothesized that (1) lower levels of trait EI will be
associated with higher scores for antisocial, borderline, and histrionic personality traits, and high
levels of trait EI will be associated with high scores of narcissistic personality traits; (2)
individuals’ trait EI scores, under honest responding instructions, will be significantly lower
than those under the motivated faking instructions; (3) motivated faking trait EI scores will be
predicted by honest responding trait EI scores and social desirability scores; (4) the pattern of
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associations expected in hypothesis 1 will be replicated using residuals of trait EI and personality
trait scores (i.e., controlling for faking). Day and Carroll’s (2008) null findings regarding ability
EI requires further investigation so the above hypotheses will be tested again using a measure of
ability EI. Given the relative absence of research on sex differences in studies of faking on
measures of EI, no specific hypotheses regarding sex differences are advanced and analyses of
such differences will be preliminary in nature.
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CHAPTER 2
Methods
Participants
A total of 169 individuals participated in the present study, but only 118 completed both
part 1 and part 2 of the study. As honest EI scores were collected in part 1 and faked EI scores
were collected in part 2, only data from the 118 participants that completed both parts were
included in the analyses, in order to maintain consistent variance. One of these individuals
needed to be excluded from the analyses, due to her not completing the faking instructions
appropriately, thus, the final sample size was 117 participants (85% women). As such, the
hypotheses were tested using the total sample that included both men and women.
Undergraduate students from the University of Windsor were recruited through the participant
pool. The psychology participant pool at the University of Windsor facilitates the collection of
data for research studies. It is a service that allows researchers to advertise their studies and
recruit participants. Undergraduate students can then sign up to participate in studies through the
participant pool and, once they have completed the study, they are then awarded extra credit for
psychology courses. No specific exclusion criteria was applied other than the ability to read and
provide responses in English. Students received appropriate course credit, as compensation for
participation.
Measures
Emotional Quotient Inventory: Short (EQ-i:S; Bar-On, 2002). The EQ-i:S is a 51item self-report questionnaire designed to measure trait EI (Bar-On, 2002). Items are rated on a
5-point Likert type scale (i.e., 1 = Very seldom true of me and 5 = very often true of me). Bar-On’s
(1997, 2002, 2006) measure of trait EI consists of five subscales of self-perceived abilities that,
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when combined, create a total EI score, which represents an estimate of emotional and social
competencies. The Intrapersonal subscale measures self-respect, how well one can identify and
understand their own emotions, assertiveness, independence, and self-actualization. The
Interpersonal subscale measures empathy, social responsibility, and how well one can identify
and understand others’ emotional states. The Stress Management subscale refers to stress
tolerance, impulse control, and regulation of one’s own emotions, as well as those of surrounding
individuals. The Adaptability subscale measures one’s flexibility, problem solving skills, and
ability to perceive objectively. Finally, the General Mood subscale refers to optimism, affinity to
communicate positive emotions, and tendency to enjoy oneself. The EQ-i:S also incorporates a
positive impression scale and inconsistency index (Bar-On, 2002; Parker, Keefer, & Wood,
2011).
Based on the correlation between the EQ-i:S items and EQ-i items (correlations ranging
between .73 and .97), the EQ-i:S’s positive correlation with other measures of EI (i.e., the
MSCEIT, the Trait Meta Mood Scale, and the Toronto Alexithymia Scale), and the low to
moderate correlations between the EQ-i:S items and personality traits support the construct
validity of the EQ-i:S (Bar-On, 2002). Further, predictive validity of the EQ-i:S is supported by
the positive relationship between the EQ-i:S and job performance, leadership, and academic
success. In addition, the internal reliability for the EQ-i:S was supported by Bar-On (2002;
Cronbach’s alpha = .76 to .93), as well as Parker et al. (2011; Cronbach’s alpha = .75 to .87).
The EQ-i:S was also found to have good test-retest reliability (correlations ranging from .46 to
.80; Bar-On, 2002). Using the present study’s sample, the Cronbach’s alpha for the EQ-i:S total
was 0.89.
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Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test Version 2.0 (MSCEIT V2.0).
The MSCEIT is a well-established measure of ability EI (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios,
2003). The MSCEIT is a maximum-performance test that contains items that have correct and
incorrect responses, based on the usual practice of collecting standardized data for test
construction and validation, but also expert criteria and consensus responses (Mayer et al., 2003).
Authorities in the field of emotion research selected responses they perceived as correct, and
consensus responses were established when the majority of participants selected the same
response. Mayer et al. (2003) found that the MSCEIT V2.0 has good split-half reliability (r = .91
to .93) and test-retest reliability (r = .86). Rossen and Kranzler (2009) also found good
incremental validity of the MSCEIT V2.0 over measures of positive relations with others and
alcohol use (Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test). Additionally, Brackett and Salovey,
(2006) reported good predictive validity and discriminant validity.
This measure is based on the notion that EI is an ability (or set of related abilities) that
encompasses problem solving about emotions and using emotions (Mayer et al., 2003). It is a
141-item measure intended to assess the four domains of ability EI (i.e., perceiving emotions,
understanding emotions, using emotions to facilitate thought, and managing emotions) using
performance on tasks. Perceiving emotions is assessed with the faces and pictures tasks. The
faces task consists of participants rating a photo of a face for how present a specific emotion is
and the pictures task entails rating landscapes and abstract designs. Using emotion to facilitate
thought is measured with the sensations and facilitations tasks, and understanding emotions is
assessed via blends and changes tasks. The sensations task asks participants to match a sensation
to an emotion they have generated. The facilitation task requires the respondents to evaluate
emotions that are associated with or assist specific tasks or behaviours. Further, the blends task
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asks respondents to distinguish emotions that could be blended to make another emotion. The
changes task entails the participant selecting an emotion that is the consequence of the
intensification of another separate emotion. Finally, managing emotions is measured with an
emotion management task and emotion relationships task. The emotion management task
presents the respondent with a story from which they need to select the behaviours that are most
effective in obtaining the desired emotion. Lastly, the emotion relationships task consists of the
participant selecting the appropriate actions to manage others’ emotions. The MSCEIT
demonstrated excellent reliability in the present study, which a Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.95.
Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire-4+ (PDQ-4+). The PDQ-4+ (Hyler, 1994) is a
self-report measure of personality disorder traits (Fonseca-Pedrero, Paino, Lemos-Giráldez, &
Muñiz, 2013). It consists of 99 true or false items, which reflect personality traits associated with
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental disorders (DSM) criteria. Previous research in
this area has used this measure to assess personality traits in non-clinical samples (Gardner &
Qualter, 2009; Leible & Snell, 2004; Webb & McMurran, 2008). The PDQ-4+ has adequate
psychometric properties (Widiger & Samuel, 2005) with good overall internal consistency
(Cronbach’s alpha = .81) and good discriminant validity (Blackburn, Donnelly, Logan, &
Renwick, 2004). According to Bagby and Farvolden (2004) reported reasonable concurrent and
predictive validity. The Cronbach’s alpha for the PDQ-4+ in the present study was 0.90, which
suggests excellent reliability.
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR). The BIDR is a 40-item selfreport measure designed to assess self-deception and impression management (Paulhus, 1991).
Responses are made on a 7-point Likert type scale (Kam, 2013). The BIDR measures selfdeception, which refers to responses that are inaccurate, but believed by the respondent, as well
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as impression management, which refers to inaccurate responses facilitated by wanting to appear
more favorable (Kroner & Weekes, 1996). The BIDR has good internal consistency (Cronbach’s
alpha = .83) and test-retest reliability (r = .65 to .69) and also good concurrent and discriminant
validity (Paulhus, 1988). In the present study, Cronbach’s alpha was 0.81, which is indicative of
good reliability.
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, Second Edition (WASI-II; Wechsler,
2011). The WASI-II is a recently-updated shortened measure of cognitive ability, for individuals
ages 6 to 90 years, that can be used when a full intelligence measure is not feasible (McCrimmon
& Smith, 2013). The two-subtest version of the WASI-II, which includes the Vocabulary and
Matrix Reasoning subtests, was used for the present study. For both of these subsets, a trained
examiner uses set procedures and standardized stimuli (testing materials that comprise the kit) to
assess the examinee’s performance, recording the examinee’s responses, scoring them according
to the correct answers, and interpreting results with reference to normative data. The Vocabulary
subtest consists of 31 items that assess individuals’ word knowledge, verbal concept formation,
knowledge, crystallized intelligence, and degree of language formation. Words are orally
presented to the examinee, who must then define or describe them verbally. On the other hand,
the Matrix Reasoning subtest is a measure of fluid and visual intelligence, spatial ability, and
perceptual organization. The examinee assesses the uncomplete matrix and select one out of five
options that appropriately completes the matrix. The WASI-II has sound psychometric properties
(McCrimmon & Smith, 2013). Internal consistency of the WASI-II is good (r = .92 to .97), as is
test-retest reliability (r = .79 to .96), and interrater reliability (r = .94 to .99). Similarly, the
WASI-II has good concurrent validity with the WAIS-IV and WISC-IV (r = .71 to .92). It also
has good internal validity, as the subscales are all interrelated, but factor analysis showed that
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each subtest is also unique. This measure will be used as a control, given the research confirming
associations between cognitive ability and ability EI and the influence of cognitive abilities on
ability to fake responses.
Procedure
Undergraduate participants, recruited from the participant pool at the University of
Windsor, were asked to participate in two testing sessions. The first involved the online
completion of a battery of self-report questionnaires in a single session. The participants were
given instructions to complete the measures as honestly as possible (the honest responding
condition). Their honest responses were highlighted as essential to the validity of the study and
they were encouraged to respond honestly regardless of whether their responses made them
appear unappealing. The ability EI measure could not be completed remotely online, given its
format and the administration requirements of the publisher, thus, a second session took place in
the lab. Participants first completed the ability EI measure, with instructions to respond as
honestly as possible (the final measure to be completed as part of the honest responding
condition). Following this, participants completed an assessment of cognitive abilities (i.e., the
Matrix Reasoning and Vocabulary subtests of the WASI-II). Then, in the same lab session, the
participants completed the motivated faking condition. The student researcher gave the
participants a form of prompts (Appendix A) to complete. This form indicated that the
participants were to imagine that they were applying for their dream job. The form explained that
after answering some questions regarding the details of the job, the participants would complete
the EI measures again, but this time participants were to imagine they were applying for this
dream job and that the individuals hiring them for the job would have access to their responses to
the EI measures. They were then asked to complete the EQ-i:S and MSCEIT again. Participants
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were directed to respond to items on the trait and ability EI measures in a manner they believed
would optimize anticipated success for their fictional job application while still appearing
believable.
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CHAPTER 3
Results
Approach to Data Analysis
First, data were examined for potentially invalid responding, using the Inconsistency
Index, which is built into the EQ-i:S. A missing values analysis was then performed and multiple
imputation was conducted to estimate the missing values. Composite scores were calculated for
the BIDR, EQ-i:S, and PDQ-4. MSCEIT composite scores were calculated by the publisher and
provided to the research team, as per the publisher’s standard practice with investigators using
the MSCEIT for research purposes. Assumptions of parametric tests (i.e., Pearson correlations, ttest, multiple regression analysis) were evaluated. Proposed analyses to test the main hypotheses
of the present study were then undertaken. Finally, some additional analyses (i.e., Pearson
correlations) were conducted to address the concern that EI and personality (therefore,
personality disorders) overlap too much. All analyses were conducted using Statistical Package
for the Social Science (SPSS) software, Version 24.
Preliminary Analyses
Invalid responding. The Inconsistency Index, embedded in the EQ-i:S, was used to
determine whether participants were responding invalidly. This index is composed of 10 pairs of
items that asked about similar issues. The difference between the responses of each of those pairs
were calculated and summed. If the sum of the differences was 12 or greater, the participant was
likely providing random responses. Six participants’ Inconsistency Indexes exceeded this cutoff,
thus, they were excluded from the analyses.
Missing data. A missing values analysis was conducted in order to determine the amount
of missing data present. The proportion of missing data among variables ranged from 0% to
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2.5%. Overall, 0.558% of the data were missing. Little’s MCAR test indicated that the data were
missing completely at random, 𝑋 2 (17997) = 43.678, p = 1.000. As the sample in the present
study was small, multiple imputation was conducted to estimate the missing values for cognitive
ability, the BIDR-SDE, BIDR-IM, the EQ-i:S (from both conditions) and the PDQ-4.
Assumptions. Before analyzing the data to test the hypotheses, the following assumptions
of parametric tests were evaluated.
Outliers. A multiple regression analysis (MRA) assumption is having an absence of both
outliers and influential observations. Outliers were tested for using standardized residuals (i.e., a
value of ±2.5 is a violation; Field, 2013). There were three outliers for faked trait EI scores, three
for Vocabulary, one for Matrix Reasoning, six for the BIDR-SDE, four for the BIDR-IM, three for
ability EI scores, and four for faked ability EI scores. All outliers were winsorized to improve
normality and to preserve sample size. To test for influential observations, Cook’s distance was
examined. All values were less than one, thus, this assumption was not violated (Cook & Weisberg,
1982).
Normality. Univariate normality is expected when conducting Pearson correlations, t-tests,
and multiple regression analysis. Shapiro-Wilk values were not significant for cognitive ability,
BIDR-IM, and honest EQ-i:S, indicating normality of these variables. Shapiro-Wilk values were
significant, however, for BIDR-SDE, faked EQ-i:S, antisocial, borderline, histrionic, and
narcissistic traits, and honest and fake MSCEIT scores, indicating non-normal distribution. These
variables were not a concern, however, as the Shapiro-Wilk test can be sensitive to small deviations
from normality (Field, 2013) and their skewness and kurtosis values were within the accepted
range (i.e., ±2 and ±3, respectively; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2016). Their normality also improved
once outliers were winsorized. Of particular concern, however, were faked trait EI scores and faked
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ability EI scores. Although skewness and kurtosis were in the acceptable range for faked trait EI
scores (skewness = -1.176, kurtosis = 2.203), the histogram appeared to be quite negatively
skewed. Similarly, although skewness and kurtosis values were acceptable for faked ability EI
scores (skewness = -1.390, kurtosis = 1.724), the histogram was clearly negatively skewed. As
these were dependent variables in the MRAs and the present study has a small sample size, in
addition to the data deviating slightly from linearity, slight heteroscedasticity, and non normality
of residuals, faked trait EI scores and faked ability EI scores were transformed. Both variables
were negatively skewed, thus, the data were reflected first. A log transformation was then
performed for both variables. After the transformations of the two dependent variables (i.e., faked
trait EI scores and faked ability EI scores), the residuals reflected a normal distribution. ASPD,
BPD, HPD, and NPD traits all had acceptable skewness and kurtosis values. Histograms of the
residuals were examined as well to determine normality of the data.
Linearity. Another assumption of MRA requires that the relationship between the dependent
and independent variables to be linear (Field, 2013). Each predictor variable was plotted against
the dependent variable for each MRA. For both the trait EI MRA and the ability EI MRA, the
scatter plots of the standardized residuals and the standardized predicted values were linear, once
the data were transformed.
Homoscedasticity. Scatter plots of the residuals were examined in order to determine
whether the assumption of homoscedasticity was met. Upon examination of the plotted
standardized residuals and standardized predicted value for the trait EI regression, the data were
heteroscedastic. Although this assumption was violated, MRA is considered to be robust to the
violations of homoscedasticity (Cohen et al., 2003) and the data appeared to be more
homoscedastic once the dependent variables were transformed.
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Multicollinearity. A correlation matrix and VIF values were examined in order to test for
multicollinearity and singularity. None of the variables shared a correlation higher than .9 and VIF
values remained far below 10 (Field, 2013), satisfying this assumption.
Independence of errors. The Durbin-Watson values were examined to ensure that no two
residual terms were correlated. Durbin-Watson values were all within normal limits (i.e., between
1 and 3; Field, 2013), thus, this assumption was met.
Descriptive Analyses
For descriptive statistics of the present study’s variables, see Table 6. For correlations
between the present study’s variables, see Table 7. The faked trait EI scores and faked ability EI
scores were changed to be positively skewed, instead of negatively skewed, in order to be log
transformed. As such, these scores reflect a low score, when they should be reflecting high scores.
Thus, when interpreting the log transformed faked trait EI and log transformed faked ability EI,
the direction of the relationship needs to be reversed. For example, when interpreting the
correlations from Table 7, the correlation between LOG EQI and HONEST EQI appears to be
negative (i.e., r = -.332), but due to the above explanation, it should be interpreted as a positive
relationship.
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for all Variables, N = 117
Variable
M
SD
AGE
22.15
4.53

Min.
18

Max.
44

VOCAB

47.50

9.16

27.00

68.00

MATRIX

47.64

7.73

27.00

66.00

BIDR-SDE

84.11

11.25

59.00

109.00

BIDR-IM

80.82

13.09

56.00

109.00

HONEST EQI

32.74

3.81

23.52

44.80

FAKED EQI

41.32

2.91

33.20

45.00

LOG FAKED EQI

.70

.21

.30

1.14

HONEST MSCEIT

.49

.06

.33

.56

FAKED MSCEIT

.49

.06

.31

.56

LOG FAKED MSCEIT

-.80

.13

-1.00

-.46

ANTISOCIAL

.97

1.05

0.00

5.00

BORDERLINE

2.74

1.99

0.00

8.00

HISTRIONIC

2.18

1.47

0.00

6.00

NARCISSISTIC

2.55

1.81

0.00

9.00

Note. VOCAB = Vocabulary subtest from WASI-II; MATRIX = Matrix Reasoning subtest from WASI-II; BIDRSDE = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding – Self-Deceptive Enhancement; BIDR-IM = Balanced Inventory
of Desirable Responding – Impression Management; HONEST EQI = trait EI scores from the honest responding
condition; FAKED EQI = trait EI scores from the motivated faking condition; LOG FAKED EQI = trait EI scores
from the motivated faking question that have been transformed; HONEST MSCEIT = ability EI scores from the honest
responding condition; FAKED MSCEIT = ability EI scores from the motivated faking condition; LOG FAKED
MSCEIT = ability EI scores from the motivated faking question that have been transformed; ANTISOCIAL = the
Antisocial Personality Disorder subscale from the Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire, Version 4; BORDERLINE
= the Borderline Personality Disorder subscale from the Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire, Version 4;
HISTRIONIC = the Histrionic Personality Disorder subscale from the Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire, Version
4; NARCISSISTIC = the Narcissistic Personality Disorder subscale from the Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire,
Version 4
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Table 7
Correlations Between Study Variables
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

1. VOCAB

-

2. MATRIX

.175*

-

3. BIDR-SDE

-.107

-.084

-

4. BIDR-IM

-.139

-.140

.396**

-

5. HONEST EQI

.199*

.070

.489**

.106

-

6. FAKED EQI

.195*

.128

.022

-.009

.288**

-

7. LOG EQI

-.188*

-.129

-.084

-.042

-.332**

-.963**

-

8. HONEST MSCEIT

.332**

.275**

.016

-.029

.324**

.443**

-.426**

-

9. FAKED MSCEIT

.295**

.303**

-.033

-.135

.266**

.403**

-.377**

.883*

-

10. LOG MSCEIT

-.309**

-.318**

.043

.157*

-.277**

-.406**

.384**

-.859**

-.983**

-

11. ANTISOCIAL

-.090

.025

-.225**

-.372**

-.308**

-.120

.151

-.104

-.006

.002

-

12. BORDERLINE

-.108

.002

-.415**

-.221**

-.541**

-.184*

.187*

-.170*

-.097

.080

.456**

-

13. HISTRIONIC

.128

.128

-.287**

-.321**

-.110

-.039

.023

-.088

-.049

.044

.326**

.379**

-

14. NARCISSISTIC

-.040

.049

-.307**

-.359**

-.200*

-.144

.134

-.148

-.023

.013

.282**

.260**

.365**

Note. * p < .05, **p < .001 ; Note. VOCAB = Vocabulary subtest from WASI-II; MATRIX = Matrix Reasoning subtest from WASI-II; BIDR-SDE = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding
– Self-Deceptive Enhancement; BIDR-IM = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding – Impression Management; HONEST EQI = trait EI scores from the honest responding condition;
FAKED EQI = trait EI scores from the motivated faking condition; LOG FAKED EQI = trait EI scores from the motivated faking question that have been transformed; HONEST MSCEIT =
ability EI scores from the honest responding condition; FAKED MSCEIT = ability EI scores from the motivated faking condition; LOG FAKED MSCEIT = ability EI scores from the motivated
faking question that have been transformed; ANTISOCIAL = the Antisocial Personality Disorder subscale from the Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire, Version 4; BORDERLINE = the
Borderline Personality Disorder subscale from the Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire, Version 4; HISTRIONIC = the Histrionic Personality Disorder subscale from the Personality Diagnostic
Questionnaire, Version 4; NARCISSISTIC = the Narcissistic Personality Disorder subscale from the Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire, Version 4
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14.

-

Main Analyses
Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis was that lower levels of trait and ability EI would be
associated with higher scores for antisocial, borderline, and histrionic personality traits, and high
levels of trait and ability EI would be associated with high scores of narcissistic personality traits.
Hypothesis 1 was tested using Pearson correlations. As shown in Table 7, this hypothesis was
partially supported. As expected, trait EI was negatively correlated with ASPD traits (r = -.308, p
< .001) and BPD traits (r = -.541, p < .001). NPD traits were significantly correlated with trait EI,
but, contrary to what was predicted, this was also a negative relationship (r = -.200, p = .015).
Thus, participants who had higher levels of ASPD, BPD, and NPD traits tended to also have lower
trait EI. HPD and trait EI were not correlated (r = -.110, p = .118).
As expected, BPD traits were negatively associated with ability EI (r = -.170, p = .034),
meaning individuals who had higher levels of BPD trait also tended to have lower ability EI.
Contrary to Hypothesis 1, ASPD traits (r = -.104, p = .133), HPD traits (r = -.088, p = .173), and
NPD traits (r = -.148, p = .056) were not significantly associated with ability EI.
Hypothesis 2. The second hypothesis was that individuals’ trait and ability EI scores, under
honest responding instructions, would be significantly lower than those under the motivated faking
instructions. Paired sample t-tests were conducted in order to test Hypothesis 2 (see Table 8). As
predicted, trait EI scores were significantly higher in the motivated faking condition than they were
in the honest responding condition, t (116) = -22.77, p < .001, d = -2.10, representing a very large
effect size. With regards to ability EI, the honest responding group was not significantly different
from the motivated faking group, t (116) = .007, p = .994.
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Table 8
Paired Samples t-Tests Comparing Honest and Motivated Faking EI
Mean
Trait EI (EQI)
-8.58
Motivated faking vs. honest
Ability EI (MSCEIT)
Motivated faking vs. honest

.000019

SD

t

Sig.

4.08

-22.77

.000

.03

.007

.994

Hypothesis 3. The third hypothesis was that motivated faking EI scores would be predicted
by honest responding EI scores and social desirability scores, for both ability and trait EI. This
hypothesis was tested using MRA; one MRA was conducted using trait EI scores and a second
MRA was conducted using ability EI scores (see Table 9 and Table 10). Due to the data being
reflected when transformed, the direction of the relationships (i.e., whether the coefficient is
positive or negative) were reversed.
For trait EI, the first step of the model, in which honest trait EI was added, significantly
predicted EI scores from the motivated faking condition (𝑅2 = .110, adjusted 𝑅 2 = .102, F (1,
115) = 14.218, p < .001). Therefore, trait EI scores from the honest responding condition
accounted for 10% of the variance in faking trait EI scores. Upon closer inspection, for every one
standard deviation increase in honest trait EI scores, trait EI scores from the motivated faking
condition increased by .332 standard deviations, 𝛽 = -.332, p < .001, 95% CI [-.028, -.009]. In
the second step, when socially desirable responding was added as a predictor, the change in
amount of variance accounted for was not significant. Neither self-deception or impression
management contributed significantly to the model, but honest trait EI scores remained a
significant predictor, 𝛽 = -.388, p < .001, 95% CI [-.033, -.010]. With every one standard
deviation increase in honest trait EI scores, faked trait EI scores increased .388 standard
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deviations. As such, the hypothesis was partially supported; higher faked trait EI scores were
predicted by higher honest EI scores, but faked trait EI scores not predicted by social desirability.
Faked ability EI was also significantly predicted by the first step, in which WASI-II
Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning subtests were entered (𝑅2 = .159, adjusted 𝑅 2 = .144, F (2,
113) = 10.66, p < .001), as well as the second step, in which cognitive ability, ability EI scores
from the honest responding condition, self-deceptive socially desirable responding, and
impression management were included in the model all together (𝑅2 = .869, adjusted 𝑅2 = .743,
F (3, 110) = 89.06, p < .001). Cognitive ability was included in the first step of the model, as it
was not a main predictor, but needed to be controlled for. In the first step of the model,
Vocabulary was a significant predictor (𝛽 = -.263, p = .003, 95% CI [-.006, -.001]), as was
Matrix Reasoning (𝛽 = -.257, p = .004, 95% CI [-.008, -.001]). With every one standard
deviation increase in Vocabulary scores, faked ability EI scores increased .263 standard
deviations, and with each one standard deviation increase in Matrix Reasoning scores, faked
ability EI scores increased .257 standard deviations. At the second step of the model, together,
cognitive ability and honest ability EI scores accounted for 74% of faked ability EI’s variance
(𝑅2 = .743, adjusted 𝑅2 = .736, F (1, 112) = 254.70, p < .001). Cognitive ability was no longer a
significant predictor of ability EI scores, but honest ability EI scores (𝛽 = -.833, p < .001, 95%
CI [-2.23, -1.74]) accounted for a significant amount of faked ability EI’s variance. With each
one standard deviation increase in honest ability EI scores, faked ability EI scores increased .833
standard deviations. At the third step, when socially desirable responding was added, the change
in amount of variance accounted for was not significant; however, honest ability EI scores
remained a significant predictor (𝛽 = -.837, p < .001, 95% CI [-2.23, -1.74]) and impression
management (𝛽 = .112, p = .031, 95% CI [.000, .002]) accounted for a significant amount of
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faked ability EI’s variance. With each one standard deviation increase in honest ability EI scores,
faked ability EI scores increased .837 standard deviations, and with each one standard deviation
increase in impression management, faked ability EI scores decreased by .112 standard
deviations. Again, Hypothesis 3 was partially supported; higher ability EI scores from the honest
responding condition and lower levels of impression management predicted higher ability EI
scores from the motivated faking condition. Self-deception did not account for a significant
amount of the variance.
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Table 9
Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Faked EQ-i Scores
95% CI
Step
1

2

Variable
CONSTANT

B
1.307

SE B
.161

𝛽
-

t
8.10

Sig.
.000

Lower
.987

Upper
1.627

HONEST EQI

-.018

.005

-.332

-3.77

.000

-.028

-.009

CONSTANT

1.276

.193

6.62

.000

.894

1.658

HONEST EQI

-.022

.006

-.388

-3.81

.000

-.033

-.010

BIDR-SDE

.002

.002

.126

1.14

.255

-.002

.006

BIDR-IM

-.001

.002

-.051

-.52

.602

-.004

.002

R2
.110

Adjusted R2
.102

ΔR2
.110

F Change
14.22

Sig. F Change
.000

.120

.097

.010

.657

.520

Note. BIDR-SDE = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding – Self-Deceptive Enhancement; BIDR-IM = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding –
Impression Management; HONEST EQI = trait EI scores from the honest responding condition
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Table 10
Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Faked MSCEIT Scores
95% CI
Step
1

2.

3.

Variable
CONSTANT

B
-.397

SE B
.089

𝛽

t
-4.46

Sig.
.000

Lower
-.573

Upper
-.220

VOCAB

-.004

.001

-.263

-3.00

.003

-.006

-.001

MATRIX

-.005

.002

-.257

-2.93

.004

-.008

-.001

CONSTANT

.245

.064

3.849

.000

.119

.371

VOCAB

.000

.001

-.019

-.374

.709

-.002

.001

MATRIX

-.001

.001

-.071

-1.415

.160

-.003

.001

HONEST MSCEIT

-1.978

.124

-.833

-15.959

.000

-2.223

-1.732

.147

.086

1.71

.089

-.023

.317

VOCAB

-.000074

.001

-.005

-.10

.921

-.002

.001

MATRIX

-.001

.001

-.062

-1.25

.213

-.003

.001

HONEST MSCEIT

-1.99

.122

-.837

-16.23

.000

-2.229

-1.744

BIDR-SDE

.000

.001

-.010

-.19

.851

-.001

.001

BIDR-IM

.001

.001

.112

2.19

.031

.000

.002

CONSTANT

R2
.159

Adjusted R2
.144

ΔR2
.159

F Change
10.66

Sig. F Change
.000

.743

.736

.584

254.70

.000

.755

.743

.012

2.60

.079

Note. VOCAB = Vocabulary subtest from WASI-II; MATRIX = Matrix Reasoning subtest from WASI-II; BIDR-SDE = Balanced Inventory of Desirable
Responding – Self-Deceptive Enhancement; BIDR-IM = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding – Impression Management; HONEST MSCEIT = ability
EI scores from the honest responding condition
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Hypothesis 4. The fourth hypothesis was that the pattern of associations expected in Hypothesis
1 would be replicated after controlling for faking. A multiple regression analysis was conducted
once with honest EI scores as the dependent variable and faked EI scores as the predictor variable
and then again with honest EI as the dependent variable and both faked EI scores and socially
desirable responding as predictor variables. This was done for both trait and ability EI. Thus, these
produced residuals, which were then correlated with the Cluster B trait scores. When faked EI
scores and socially desirable responding were both controlled for (see Table 11), the relationships
between trait EI and ASPD traits (r = -.232, p < .001), and trait EI and BPD traits (r = -.367, p <
.001), and the relationship between ability EI and NPD traits (r = -.185, p < .001) remained
negatively correlated. When only faked EI scores were controlled for (See Table 12), the
relationships between trait EI and ASPD traits (r = -.273, p < .001), trait EI and BPD traits (r = .507, p < .001), and trait EI and NPD traits (r = -.165, p = .037) remained statistically significant.
The relationships between ability EI and ASPD traits (r = -.184, p = .024), ability EI and BPD
traits (r = -.191, p = .020), and ability EI and NPD traits (r = -.245, p = .004) also remained
statistically significant.
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Table 11
Correlations between Residuals and Personality Traits, Including Social Desirability
1.
1. EQI

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

-

2. MSCEIT

.085

-

3. BIDR-SDE

.000

.000

-

4. BIDR-IM

.000

.000

-.396**

-

5. ASPD

-.232**

-120

-.225**

-.372**

-

6. BPD

-.367**

-.151

-.415**

-.221**

.456**

-

7. HPD

.009

-.055

-.287**

-.321**

.326**

.379**

-

8. NPD

-.054

-.185*

-.307**

-.359**

.282**

.260**

.365**

Note. * p < .05, **p < .001

Table 12
Correlations between Residuals and Personality Traits, Not Including Social Desirability
1.
1. EQI
2. MSCEIT

8.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

.082

-

3. ASPD

-.273**

-.184*

-

4. BPD

-.507**

-.191*

.456**

-

5. HPD

-.109

-.119

.326**

.379**

-

6. NPD

-.165*

-.245**

.282**

.260**

.365**

Note. * p < .05, **p < .001
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Post hoc analyses. As acknowledged in the Introduction, there is conceptual overlap between
Cluster B personality disorders and EI, with the latter representing core features of the former. In
the relative absence of systematic work on personality disorders and the subscales of trait and
ability EI measures, post hoc correlation analyses were undertaken to unpack this overlap. The
correlations in Table 13 demonstrate that different personality disorders were associated
differently with various EI subscales.
Higher HPD trait scores were significantly associated with higher ability to understand
others’ emotions (r = .210, p = .023), and lower ability to manage stress (r = -.274, p < .001) and
perceive emotions (r = -.213, p = .021). In other words, individuals who had higher HPD trait
scores appeared more able to establish cooperative, constructive, and satisfying interpersonal
relationships than those with lower HPD traits scores. However, individuals with higher HPD
trait scores also appeared more impulsive, having difficulties remaining calm and working well
under pressure, and having difficulties recognizing the emotions of others around them.
Higher NPD trait scores were significantly associated with low ability to manage stress (r
= -.328, p <.001) and understand emotions (r = -.197, p = .033). As such, individuals with higher
NPD trait scores also tended to also have difficulties remaining calm and working well under
stress, be more impulsive, and have difficulties labelling emotions and recognizing groups of
emotions.
Higher BPD trait scores were significantly associated with low understanding of one’s
own emotions (r = -.301, p < .001), poor stress management (r = -.630, p < .001), less
adaptability (r = -.237, p = .010), negative general mood (r = -.549, p < .001), and less ability to
use emotions to facilitate thought (r = -.222, p = .017). That is to say, individuals with higher
BPD trait scores also tended to have EI scores that indicated poor self-awareness and limited
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ability to express their own emotions, difficulties remaining calm and working well under
pressure, greater impulsivity, less flexibility regarding change and everyday problems, lack of
optimism, energy, and self-motivation, and difficulties using emotional knowledge to problemsolve.
Higher ASPD trait scores were significantly associated with low ability to understand
others’ emotions (r = -.190, p = .040), poor stress management (r = -.481, p < .001), and negative
general mood (r = -.198, p = .032). As such, individuals with higher ASPD trait scores also
tended to have EI scores that indicated difficulties establishing cooperative, constructive, and
satisfying relationships, difficulties remaining calm and working well under pressure, and a lack
of optimism, energy, and self-motivation.
As there is now statistical evidence of specific associations between specific subscales of
trait and ability EI, and Cluster B disorders, specific hypotheses can be made in future research
regarding associations between these variables and directions of these variables. As such, a path
analysis model has been proposed (Appendix B), for both trait and ability EI, to be tested by the
follow-up study for which data is currently being collected.
These patterns of correlations suggested that there were some core features that overlap
among personality disorders (i.e., poor stress management), but there was notable variability in
associations between the personality disorder traits and the various EI subscales. Weaknesses or
deficits (and some strengths) in EI traits and abilities are core to Cluster B personality disorders
but they cannot be viewed, on the basis of these post hoc analyses, as synonymous. These
empirical findings, preliminary though they are, are broadly consistent with the clinical
conceptualizations of the Cluster B personality disorders, as is evident when considered in light
of the diagnostic criteria for each.
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Table 13
Correlations Between Personality Disorder Traits and EQ-i:S and MSCEIT subscales
1.
1. HISTRIONIC

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

-

2. NARCISSISTIC

.365**

-

3. BORDERLINE

.379**

.260**

-

4. ANTISOCIAL

.326**

.282**

.456**

-

5. EQI-INTRA

-.071

-.102

-.301**

-.051

-

6. EQI-INTER

.210*

-.119

-.137

-.190*

.453**

-

7. EQI-STRESS

-.274**

-.328**

-.630**

-.481**

.333**

.184*

-

8. EQI-ADAPT

-.093

.023

-.237*

-.166

.178

.260*

.289**

-

9. EQI-MOOD

-.145

-.145

-.549**

-.198*

.651**

.369**

.481**

.376**

-

10. BRANCH 1

-.213*

-.066

-.097

-.061

.285**

.243**

.085

-.013

.069

-

11. BRANCH 2

-.137

-.076

-.222*

-.094

.220*

.317**

.227*

.250**

.174

.477**

-

12. BRANCH 3

.032

-.197*

-.105

-.130

.102

.390**

.123

.143

.050

.244**

.529**

-

13. BRANCH 4

.066

.033

-.050

.028

.073

.234*

.007

-.007

.003

.250**

.425**

.466**

-

Note. Note. * p < .05, **p < .001; EQI-INTRA = EQ-i:S Intrapersonal subscale; EQI-INTER = EQ-i:S Interpersonal subscale; EQI-STRESS = EQ-i:S Stress Management
subscale; EQI-ADAPT = EQ-i:S Adaptability subscale; EQI-MOOD = EQ-i:S General Mood subscale; BRANCH 1 = MSCEIT Perceiving Emotions subscale; BRANCH 2 =
MSCEIT Facilitating Thought subscale; BRANCH 3 = MSCEIT Understanding Emotions subscale; BRANCH 4 = MSCEIT Managing Emotions subscale
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Personality disorder diagnostic criteria and EI subscales.
Each personality disorder was associated with a different combination of EI aspects,
likely depending on the defining and differentiating characteristics between the personality
disorders. As shown by Tables 14 through 17, some of the correlations between EI and the
Cluster B personality disorders overlapped with the diagnostic criteria, but many do not, again
indicating that EI seems to be of central importance to the Cluster B disorders, but not
synonymous with them.
As can be seen in Table 14, ASPD diagnostic criteria mapped onto the EI domains of
understanding others’ emotions, negative affect, and impulsivity and poor planning, but there
were other diagnostic criteria (i.e., failure to conform to social norms, deceitfulness, reckless
disregard for the safety of self or others, and repeated irresponsibility) that did not map on to trait
or ability EI constructs.
As seen in Table 15, BPD diagnostic criteria mapped, to at least some degree, onto
numerous EI domains (i.e., lack of self-awareness, difficulties remaining calm, impulsivity, low
affect, and inability to use emotional information to problem solve), but there were also
diagnostic criteria (i.e., unstable and intense personal relationships) that were not reflected in the
post hoc associations with EI. Further, the finding that lacking emotional flexibility was
associated with BPD traits did not equate to any diagnostic criteria.
Similarly, HPD’s diagnostic criteria did appear to map onto some EI domains (i.e.,
difficulties recognizing and understanding others’ emotions), but again, there were multiple EI
domains that were not significantly associated with HPD scores (i.e., self-awareness, emotional
flexibility, overall positive affect, perceiving, facilitating thought, understanding emotions, and
managing emotions). There were also diagnostic criteria that were not reflected in EI domain
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scores (i.e., believes relationships to be more intimate than they are, discomfort when not the
center of attention, inappropriately sexually seductive or provocative, uses physical appearance
to gain attention, rapidly shifting and shallow expressions of emotion, speech style that is
excessively impressionistic and lacks detail, self-dramatization, theatricality, and exaggerated
emotion, easily influenced by others), and correlations between HPD trait scores and EI domain
scores that did not map on to HPD diagnostic criteria (i.e., impulsivity, difficulties remaining
calm and working well under pressure, ability to establish cooperative, constructive, and
satisfying interpersonal relationships, difficulties recognizing others’ emotions around them; see
Table 16).
Finally, a similar mixed platter was seen in NPD traits (see Table 17). Difficulties labelling
and recognizing emotions were reflected in the correlations between NPD trait scores and EI
domain scores, and also NPD diagnostic criteria. But there were various EI domains that were
not significantly associated with NPD (i.e., self-awareness, understanding of others’ emotions,
emotional flexibility, general positive affect, perceiving emotions, facilitating thought, and
managing emotions). Further there were diagnostic criteria that were not reflected in the
correlations between EI and NPD (i.e., grandiose sense of self-importance, fantasies of unlimited
success, power, brilliance, beauty, or ideal love, belief that he/she is special and unique, requires
excessive admiration, sense of entitlement, exploitative, often envious of others or believes
others envy him/her, and arrogant, haughty behaviours or attitudes). Lastly, there were
correlations between NPD and EI that did not map on to NPD diagnostic criteria (i.e., difficulties
remaining calm and working well under stress and impulsivity).
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Table 14
Antisocial Personality Disorder: Correlations vs. Diagnostic Criteria
Associations with Emotional Intelligence
DSM-5 Criteria
Poor understanding of others’ emotions
Lack of remorse (i.e., indifference to or
rationalization after hurting or mistreating
others)
Lack of optimism, energy, and self-motivation

Irritability and aggressiveness

Impulsivity, difficulty remaining calm and
working well under pressure

Impulsivity/failure to plan ahead
Failure to conform to social norms with respect
to lawful behaviours
Deceitfulness (i.e., lying, use of aliases, conning
others)
Reckless disregard for the safety of self or others

Repeated irresponsibility (i.e., failure to sustain
work behaviour or financial obligations)
Note. Diagnostic criteria reported according to the DSM-5 (APA, 2013)
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Table 15
Borderline Personality Disorder: Correlations vs. Diagnostic Criteria
Associations with Emotional Intelligence
DSM-5 Criteria
Poor self-awareness and ability to express their
Identity disturbance (i.e., unstable self-image)
own emotions
Difficulties remaining calm and working well
under pressure

Frantic efforts to avoid abandonment

Impulsivity

Impulsivity in a minimum of two self-damaging
areas (e.g., sex, spending, substance use)

Lack of optimism, energy, and self-motivation

Affective instability/mood reactivity; chronic
feelings of emptiness; inappropriate, intense
anger; transient, stress-related paranoia

Difficulties using emotional knowledge to
problem-solve

Recurrent suicidal or self-mutilating behaviour

Lack of flexibility regarding change and
everyday problems
Unstable and intense interpersonal relationships
Note. Diagnostic criteria reported according to the DSM-5 (APA, 2013)
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Table 16
Histrionic Personality Disorder: Correlations vs. Diagnostic Criteria
Associations with Emotional Intelligence
DSM-5 Criteria
Impulsivity
Difficulties remaining calm and working well
under pressure
Able to establish cooperative, constructive, and
satisfying interpersonal relationships
Difficulties recognizing others’ emotions around
them

Considers relationships to be more intimate than
they are
Discomfort when not the center of attention
Inappropriately sexually seductive or
provocative
Uses physical appearance to gain attention
Rapidly shifting and shallow expressions of
emotion
Speech style that is excessively impressionistic
and lacks detail
Self-dramatization, theatricality, and exaggerated
emotion

Easily influenced by others
Note. Diagnostic criteria reported according to the DSM-5 (APA, 2013)

60

Table 17
Narcissistic Personality Disorder: Correlations vs. Diagnostic Criteria
Associations with Emotional Intelligence
DSM-5 Criteria
Difficulties remaining calm and working well
under stress
Impulsivity
Difficulties labelling emotions and recognizing
groups of emotions

Lacks empathy, unwilling to recognize or
identify with feelings and needs of others
Grandiose sense of self-importance
Fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance,
beauty, or ideal love
Belief that he/she is special and unique
Requires excessive admiration
Sense of entitlement
Exploitative
Often envious of others or believes others envy
him/her

Arrogant, haughty behaviours or attitudes
Note. Diagnostic criteria reported according to the DSM-5 (APA, 2013)
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CHAPTER 4
Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to further explore the relationship between Cluster
B personality disorder traits and EI, as well as further our understanding of the potential for
individuals to fake their responses on trait EI measures vs. ability EI measures, and how this
might relate back to personality disorder traits. This study was largely designed with two
previous studies in mind. One was a study by Leible and Snell (2004), which looked at the
correlations between personality disorders and EI, and the other was by Day and Carroll (2008),
which explored the capacity to fake on EI measures. The overall goal of the present study was to
replicate what these two studies found, with the EQ-i:S and MSCEIT, and to extend these lines
of research by linking the potential to fake on EI measures to the relationship between Cluster B
personality disorder traits (i.e., dramatic, erratic, emotion dysregulation) and EI.
Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis, that lower levels of EI would be associated with higher levels of
ASPD, BPD, and HPD traits, and higher levels of NPD traits was partially supported. Individuals
who had lower levels of trait EI tended to have higher levels of ASPD, BPD, and NPD traits,
while participants that had lower levels of ability EI tended to also have higher levels of BPD
traits. In other words, individuals who had more BPD traits also tended to have both low trait and
low ability EI, and individuals who had more ASPD and NPD traits also tended to report lower
trait EI. These findings are broadly consistent with those reported by Leible and Snell (2004),
Gardiner and Qualter (2009), and Sinclair and Feigenbaum (2012), but somewhat contrary to
those reported by Ruiz et al. (2012), Webb et al. (2008), Petrides et al. (2011) and Nagler et al.
(2014).
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Similar to the present study’s findings, Leible and Snell (2004) found that ASPD traits, as
measured by the PDQ-4+ in a university sample, were negatively associated EI, as measured by
the Trait Meta Mood Scale (TMMS) and Multidimensional Emotional Awareness Questionnaire
(MEAQ), across the board. According to Ruiz et al. (2012), however, ASPD traits, as measured
by the Personality Exploratory Questionnaire-III (PEQ-III) in a mixed community and university
sample, were not significantly correlated with emotional clarity or repair, and they were
positively associated with emotional attention, as measured by the TMMS.
Akin to the present study’s findings, Leible and Snell (2004) also found BPD traits
among university students, as measured by the PDQ-4+, to be negatively associated with EI, as
measured by the TMMS and MEAQ. Ruiz et al. (2012), on the other hand, found that BPD traits
in a mixed community and university sample, as measured by the PEQ-III, were negatively
associated with emotional clarity and repair, but positively correlated with emotional attention.
Further, Gardiner and Qualter (2009) found a negative correlation between BPD traits in a mix of
community members and university students, as measured by an assortment of items from
multiple BPD measures, and trait EI, as measured by the Schutte EI scale. These findings are
consistent with the present study. They also found, however, a negative relationship with the
emotion management aspect of ability EI, as measured by the MSCEIT, while the present study
found a negative correlation between BPD and overall ability EI. Further, Webb et al. (2008)
focused on associations between BPD traits, as measured by the Personality Assessment
Inventory, and the full EQ-i, in undergraduate students. Unlike in the present study, they found
no relationship between BPD traits and trait EI, despite similarities in measures and population.
Finally, in a clinical sample, Sinclair and Feigenbaum (2012) found a negative correlation
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between BPD traits, as measured by the Borderline Evaluation of Severity over Time, and trait
EI, as measured by the Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire (TEIQue).
According to Leible and Snell (2004), HPD traits in university students, as measured by
the PDQ-4+, were not correlated with emotional repair, were negatively correlated with
emotional clarity and preoccupation, and were positively associated with emotional attention and
awareness, as measured by the TMMS and MEAQ. Meanwhile, Ruiz et al., (2012), found that
HPD traits in a mixed community and university sample, as measured by the PEQ-III, were
positively correlated with EI, as measured by the TMMS, across the board.
Finally, Leible and Snell (2004) found that NPD traits in university students, as measured
by the PDQ-4+, were negatively correlated with emotional clarity, repair, and preoccupation, and
positively associated with emotional monitoring, as measured by the TMMS. Contrarily, Ruiz et
al. (2012) found that NPD traits in a mixed community and university sample, as measured by
the PEQ-III, showed no correlation with emotional repair, and a positive correlation with
emotional attention and clarity, as measured by the TMMS. Further, Petrides et al. (2011) sought
to examine the relationship between NPD traits and EI in twin pairs, but they used the TEIQue to
measure EI and the Narcissistic Personality Inventory to measure NPD traits. Contrary to the
present study’s findings, they found that NPD was positively correlated with EI. Lastly, Nagler
et al. (2014) examined NPD traits and EI using the Social Skills Inventory to measure EI and the
Narcissistic Personality Inventory to measure NPD traits. Again, contrary to the present study’s
results, they found a positive relationship between NPD traits and emotional expressiveness and
control, and no relationship between NPD traits and social sensitivity.
A possible explanation for the discrepancies in findings could be the differences in
sample. Previous studies have discussed varying prevalence of personality disorder traits in
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university vs. community vs. clinical samples. For example, Ellison, Rosenstein, Morgan, and
Zimmerman (2018) found that the prevalence of BPD in the general population is approximately
1%, while it is approximately 12% in outpatient psychiatric populations and 22% in inpatient
populations. Further, Lenzenweger, Loranger, Korfine, and Neff (1997) found a prevalence rate
of 1.3% for BPD in university students, but Lenzenweger (2006) also found that the trajectory of
BPD could be quite variable for university students. Meaney, Hasking, and Reupert (2016)
conducted a meta-analysis in which they found that rates of BPD in university samples could
range from 0.5% to 32.1%. The authors suggested that one possible explanation for this
variability could be differences in the way BPD traits are measured and a diagnosis made. Thus,
it is possible that the range of BPD trait scores in the present study’s sample may be wider or not
as wide as the range found in other studies that also use the PDQ-4+. Further, other ways of
operationalizing and measuring personality disorder traits do not lend themselves easily to direct
comparisons with studies employing other operationalizations and measures.
Similarly, another potential partial explanation for the various findings, between the
present study and previous findings, is that various measures of EI were used. As mentioned
above, the measures used to assess EI in the present study were the EQ-i:S and the MSCEIT,
consistent with some previous studies but not others, for which the TEIQue, TMMS, and Social
Skills Inventory have been used. Although all these measures assess (domains of) EI, they each
have their own subscales and items that differ from one another, based on the model from which
they originate. Thus, there could be differences at the item or subscale level that, at least
partially, account for the differing results. For example, the EQ-i:S subscales are intrapersonal
abilities, interpersonal abilities, stress management, adaptability, and general mood, while the
TEIQue:SF’s subscales are well-being, self-control, emotionality, and sociability. Although there
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is overlap and similarities between the subscales of different measures (i.e., stress management
from the EQ-i:S and self-control from the TEIQue:SF), they are comprised of different items,
which might be expected to tap different aspects of core constructs or even (subtly) distinct
constructs (Pérez, Petrides, & Furnham, 2005).
Finally, another possible contributor to the varying results across the literature and in the
present study is the effects of malingering. Malingering is characterized by intentionally
producing dishonest or greatly exaggerated symptoms for the purpose of attaining external
incentives (e.g., money, avoiding work; APA, 2013). Across the literature, malingering is
considered strategic and can also be referred to as motivated distortion, dissimulation, and faking
(Grieve & Mahar, 2010). Malingering behaviours are also considered to be intermittent and
situation specific (Bass & Halligan, 2014). Researchers have found that individuals with
psychopathic traits were able to alter their EI scores to match diagnostic criteria for depression
(Grieve & Mahar, 2010). This effect was not facilitated by general cognitive ability or EI.
Although psychopathy is not synonymous with Cluster B disorders, there is conceptual and
clinical overlap. Huchzermeier et al. (2007), for example, found that individuals that had Cluster
B disorders also tended to score higher on Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist (PCL-R; Hare, 2003).
Further, they found that NPD was associated with Factor 1 (i.e., egocentric/grandiose,
unempathic, manipulative characteristics), and ASPD and BPD to be associated with Factor 2
(i.e., unstable and antisocial lifestyle). Thus, it is possible that individuals (and participants in
research studies) that have more Cluster B traits have the capacity to make their EI look bad on
purpose or they believe they have poor emotional skills, when, in reality, they do not.
Malingering would seem to be unlikely in a sample of undergraduate students who were assured
that their participation and data would remain confidential, and for whom there would be no
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obvious grounds to deliberately attempt to ‘fake bad.’ But, certainly, when one considers applied
settings (such as forensic mental health agencies and correctional services), where individuals
may wish to appear less able or more dysfunctional in order to mitigate responsibility, these
considerations take on considerable significance.
Based on the lack of consistency in the literature, more research and replication studies
are needed. Clinically, with consistency and clarity, this research avenue should afford support
and direction for a greater focus on EI domains in the treatment of those with Cluster B traits
and, indeed, diagnosed personality disorders.
Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis that trait and ability EI scores from the motivated faking condition
would be significantly higher than trait and ability EI scores from the honest responding
condition was also partially supported. Participants were able to achieve higher trait EI scores
when they were motivated to make themselves look good. Participants were not able to achieve
higher ability EI scores, however, even when they were provided with motivation to do so. These
results were consistent with Day and Carroll’s (2008) findings and support their hypothesis that
this pattern is a result of the type of measure used to assess each type of EI. Previous studies
have shown that individuals can, in fact, positively exaggerate their trait EI scores (e.g. Day &
Carroll, 2008; Grubb & McDaniel, 2007). Grubb and McDaniel (2007) suggested that self-report
EI measures are transparent and easy to reason out. In other words, perhaps individuals were able
to fake their trait EI scores because the nature of self-report questionnaires on EI domains allows
individuals to answer in ways that makes them appear to have high EI, even if what they are
saying was characteristic of them was not truly characteristic of them or vice versa. Responses to
maximum performance tests, like the MSCEIT, however, do not appear to be vulnerable to
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faking because there are right and wrong answers that cannot be deduced as easily. The findings
reported here and by others support this.
With regards to faking trait EI measures, Roberts et al. (2010) pointed to an earlier study
conducted by Dunning, Heath, and Suls (2004), in which they discuss the systematic flaws in
self-report measures. Based on this research Roberts et al. (2010) proposed the additional
explanation for the bias and response distortions on self-report EI measures; namely that
situations in which individuals are required to rate their own EI are paradoxical. Self-report EI
measures require that individuals have a certain level of self-awareness, thus, perhaps individuals
that have low EI, perhaps past a certain threshold, do not have the ability to provide valid
responses. So, in studies such as the present one, not only are these individuals not providing an
accurate baseline measure of honest EI, but they may also not be providing ‘valid’ faking data.
Additionally, perhaps there are more factors contributing to an individual’s ability to fake
responses on trait EI (i.e., self-report) measures, such as higher levels of education, superior
cognitive ability, or unknown situational details (e.g., failure to correctly interpret a social
interaction due to a lack of information; Dunning et al., 2004). The present study considered
cognitive ability as a control variable for this reason. Previous studies have demonstrated that
high ability EI is often accompanied by high cognitive ability (e.g., Ermer, Kahn, Salovey, &
Kiehl, 2012; Kahn et al., 2016; MacCann et al., 2003). In the present study, both verbal and nonverbal cognitive abilities were positively associated with ability EI. In the regression model for
ability EI, verbal and non-verbal ability were entered in the first step. Both accounted for a
significant portion in of the variance for faked EI scores, but once honest EI scores were added to
the model, they were no longer significant. This suggests that although cognitive ability was
associated with ability EI, the capacity to fake EI was not dependent on it. As such, in order to
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eliminate it as a potential bias, future studies should continue this practice and include cognitive
ability as a control when exploring ability EI.
Hypothesis 3
The third hypothesis, that faked EI scores would be predicted by honest EI scores and
socially desirable responding, for both trait and ability EI, was also partially supported. In both
cases, higher honest EI scores predicted higher faked EI scores. For trait EI, neither selfdeceptive enhancement or impression management aspects of social desirability responding
predicted faked EI scores. For ability EI, self-deceptive enhancement did not predict faked EI
scores, but impression management did. Day and Carroll (2008) also found that honest EI scores
significantly predicted faked EI scores, for both trait and ability EI, but they found both
impression management and self-deceptive enhancement to predict faked trait EI scores, but
neither predicted ability EI scores.
The present study’s finding that ability EI was predicted by impression management and
not self-deceptive enhancement is not necessarily surprising given that the self-deceptive
enhancement subscale measures one’s distorted perspective of themselves, while the impression
management subscale pertains to deliberate attempts to alter responses to appear more favorable
to others. Perhaps higher impression management was associated with lower faked ability EI
scores due to ability EI not being susceptible to faking. In other words, when completing the
ability EI maximum performance test in the honest responding condition, responses weren’t
immediately obvious and participants would have needed to reason out their answers, meaning
individuals were already trying to do their best on the maximum performance ability EI test.
Thus, when they were motivated to fake their responses, those that had higher impression
management may have felt it was necessary to change their responses, resulting in them selecting
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responses that were not what they had initially reasoned out, which worsened their scores.
Conceivably, this was not the case for trait EI because it is considered “easier” to fake responses
on such scales (Day & Carroll, 2008); impression management was not predictive of faked trait
EI scores, because the threshold for being able to fake trait EI responses is lower. For these
reasons, it is plausible that, even though ability EI was shown to not be vulnerable to faking by
the present studies as well as others (e.g., Day & Carroll, 2008; Grubb & McDaniel, 2007), faked
ability EI scores can still be linked to socially desirable responding.
Hypothesis 4
The final hypothesis, that lower levels of EI would be associated with higher levels of
ASPD, BPD, and HPD traits, and higher levels of NPD traits, after controlling for capacity to
fake was also partially supported. When social desirability was controlled for, in addition to
faked EI scores, trait EI was significantly correlated with ASPD and BPD traits; individuals who
scored lower on trait EI also tended to have higher ASPD and BPD trait scores. Thus, individuals
with more ASPD traits and individuals with more BPD traits also tended to have lower EI,
regardless of their capacity to fake their trait EI scores or their social desirability. This could be
indicative of EI being a core feature of both ASPD and BPD traits, as there was still a
relationship present even after the two theorized explanations for capacity to fake (capacity to
fake EI and social desirability response biases) had been statistically addressed. Ability EI tended
to be lower in individuals who had higher levels of NPD traits. Thus, individuals with more NPD
traits were still more likely to have lower ability EI, regardless of their capacity to fake or their
inclination to appear socially desirable. Thus, again, perhaps ability EI was a core feature of
NPD, as it was still associated with the disorder after the two theorized explanations for capacity
to fake (capacity to fake EI and social desirability response biases) had been statistically
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addressed. In summary, even though individuals were able to fake their trait EI scores and even
though impression management was related to faked ability EI scores, the correlations between
ASPD and BPD and trait EI and the correlation between NPD and ability EI still existed.
When only faked EI was controlled for, and not social desirability, both trait and ability
EI tended to be lower in individuals who also had more ASPD, BPD, and NPD traits.
Individuals who had more ASPD, BPD, and NPD traits tended to also have lower trait and ability
EI, regardless of their capacity to fake EI. As such, these significant associations persisted even
after capacity to fake was taken into account. Thus, even if individuals were able to fake their EI
responses, the correlations between trait and ability EI and ASPD, BPD, and NPD still existed.
There were more significant correlations when only capacity to fake EI was controlled for, as
opposed to both capacity to fake and social desirability. This could suggest that EI is linked to
these personality disorders, despite one’s capacity to fake their EI, but perhaps the relationship
between trait EI and NPD, and ability EI and ASPD and BPD were a result of individuals with
these disorders wanting to appear more socially desirable. For instance, perhaps social
desirability responding should be construed here as an aspect of deceitfulness in ASPD (APA,
2013), used to manipulate people (e.g., Austin, Farrelly, Black, & Moore, 2007), and this is the
aspect that EI is related to specifically. Similarly, social desirability could be an aspect of
avoidance of abandonment in BPD (APA, 2013). Ability EI could be partially linked to BPD
traits through this peripheral relationship. Finally, as in the case of ASPD, NPD also has
characteristics relating to exploitativeness (APA, 2013), which could involve wanting to manage
the impressions others form in order to manipulate them (e.g., Austin et al., 2007). Again,
perhaps trait EI is associated with NPD through this type of relationship. In summary, for the
correlations that were significant when capacity to fake was accounted for and social desirability,
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as opposed to capacity to fake only, perhaps EI is partially associated with those personality
disorders through the role that impression management plays in that particular disorder.
These correlations were not all as hypothesized, but they did reflect similar results to
those found when testing Hypothesis 1, especially when only faked EI was controlled for.
Further, the relationship between ability EI and NPD traits, and ability EI and ASPD traits
became statistically significant in these correlation analyses, but they were not in the original
correlation matrix. This could be attributed to “noise” being removed from ability EI scores that
was interfering with the relationship and the “true” variance then being reflected in the
correlation. Researchers (e.g., Day & Carroll, 2008; Grubb & McDaniel, 2007) who have
investigated the capacity to fake trait EI expressed concern about the validity of these measures.
Very importantly then, the present study demonstrated that, in the case of Cluster B disorders,
even though individuals could fake their responses to trait EI, “true” trait EI, or honest EI,
regardless of ability to fake, was still related to the Cluster B disorders.
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Post Hoc Analyses
Specific a priori hypotheses on the relationship between the Cluster B disorders and the
various components or domains of trait and ability EI (as operationalized by subscales on the
measures) were not advanced due to a relative lack of theoretical work and empirical studies in
this area. As discussed in the introduction, there were some studies (e.g., Leible & Snell, 2004;
Ruiz et al., 2012) that looked at different components of EI, but, for these studies, the
components of EI were operationalized differently by measures of EI other than the EQ-i:S and
the MSCEIT. As such, post hoc analyses were carried out to inform the development of a followup study. These results of the post hoc analyses also contribute to discussion about the
conceptual overlap between EI and the Cluster B disorders, demonstrating in this data set that
domains of EI would appear to be important in understanding Cluster B sets of traits but EI and
Cluster B disorders are clearly not interchangeable constructs.
More ASPD traits were associated with having a poor understanding of others’ emotions,
a lack of positive affect, and impulsivity and difficulties remaining calm in stressful situations.
When matched with DSM-5 criteria, these findings were consistent with the diagnostic criteria of
lacking remorse, irritability and aggressiveness, and impulsivity, respectively. There were
various components of trait and ability EI that did not significantly correlate with ASPD,
however, and four diagnostic criteria that do not appear to be matched by findings. As such,
these aspects of trait and ability EI are clearly relevant to but not synonymous with ASPD traits.
Similarly, more BPD traits were associated with poor self-awareness and ability to
communicate own emotions, difficulties remaining calm, impulsivity, poor general affect, and
difficulties using emotional knowledge to problem-solve. These map on to the DSM-5 diagnostic
criteria of identity disturbance, frantic efforts to avoid abandonment, impulsivity, emotional
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instability, and recurrent suicidal or self-mutilating behaviour, respectively. Lack of flexibility in
change and everyday issues was also associated with more BPD traits, but did not map well on to
any diagnostic criteria, while unstable and intense interpersonal relationships is a diagnostic
criterion that was not matched with findings. So, as was the case with ASPD, certain aspects of
trait and ability EI are clearly relevant to but not synonymous with BPD traits.
More HPD traits were associated with impulsivity, difficulties remaining calm, and
difficulties recognizing others’ emotions, but also the ability to have cooperative, constructive,
and satisfying relationships. EI may well be less of a core feature for HPD, as the only
correlation that was clearly mapped onto diagnostic criteria was difficulties recognizing others’
emotions, which match up to the diagnostic criterion that reflects these individuals view that
relationships are more intimate than they are in actuality. The positive correlation between HPD
and ability to establish cooperative, constructive, and satisfying relationships seems
contradictory to the negative correlation between HPD and difficulties recognizing other’s
emotions, as one would expect the latter to facilitate the former. Perhaps the diagnostic criteria
that individuals with HPD perceive relationships to be more intimate than they are leads
individuals to respond positively to items included in the interpersonal subscale score (i.e.,
ability to establish cooperative, constructive, and satisfying relationships), which creates the
positive relationship between this subscale and HPD traits.
Finally, more NPD traits were associated with difficulties remaining calm, impulsivity,
and difficulties labelling emotions and recognizing groupings of emotions. The only diagnostic
criterion that appears to be relevant here is the lack of empathy and unwillingness to recognize or
identify with feelings or needs of others, which could be seen to be reflected in the correlation
between NPD traits and difficulties labelling and recognizing emotions. As with the other Cluster
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B disorders, especially, HPD, there were correlations that did not map on to DSM-5 criteria and
vice versa. As such, while certain aspects of EI appear to be relevant in understanding NPD
traits, there is little ground to suggest the constructs are synonymous.
It should be noted that the correlations do not match perfectly with the diagnostic criteria.
These are preliminary findings and more research, with more sophisticated statistical analyses,
should be conducted to further explore these comparisons. The correlations reported here offer
some direction for future research, and follow-up work is already underway in this regard.
Limitations and Future Directions
Although a number of findings from the present study were consistent with the
hypotheses and the very few studies that have been reported in this emerging area of interest, the
study itself had a number of weaknesses that should be acknowledged. First, the regression
analyses lacked statistical power. An a priori power analysis was conducted using G*Power. It
indicated that in order to detect a medium effect size, 138 participants were needed. With a total
sample size of 117, 21 more participants would have satisfied this requirement. Thus, it is
possible that the analyses conducted were underpowered and that there were findings that would
be shown to be statistically significant with a larger sample. To address this, a follow-up study is
already underway for which we will seek to replicate and extend the present study with a larger
sample that also permits analyses by gender.
The gender distribution was another limitation of this study. The literature supports
differences in EI based on gender (e.g., Abdellatif et al., 2017; Petrides & Furnham, 2009), but
only 15% of participants (i.e., 18 individuals) self-identified as male. In the continuation of this
line of research, males will continue to be recruited, with the goal of conducting analyses
separately based on gender. Another limitation of the present study is that there were no
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hypotheses advanced regarding subscales of the EQ-i:S or MSCEIT. As a result of limited
research in the area, there was a lack of theoretical and empirical grounds on which to base
hypotheses at this level, although the earliest work in this area is intriguing. For example, a
recent study by Peter, Arntz, Klimstra, and Vingerhoets (2018) demonstrated that BPD clients
had specific deficits in ability to understand emotions and stress management. Certainly, this is
an avenue that should be addressed in future studies; as already noted, a follow-up study is
underway in which we will attempt to replicate the pattern of associations found in the post hoc
analyses of the current study. We will attempt to articulate an integrated theoretical basis for this
pattern of associations within the four Cluster B sets of traits and align this with clinical
reasoning; we intend to derive a priori hypotheses grounded in this work and to utilize path
analysis to test our efforts (see Appendix B). It would be beneficial to determine what specific
areas of ability and trait EI relate to distinct Cluster B traits and to determine if the different
domains of EI are more susceptible to faking than others.
Additionally, with regards to the methodology of the present study, the honest responding
and motivated faking conditions were not counterbalanced. This was done intentionally,
however, in order to accommodate the completion of the MSCEIT on the publisher’s website, as
was required by the publisher. It was determined that it would be impractical (or at least more
likely to result in attrition) for participants to leave Qualtrics to complete the MSCEIT on the
publisher’s website, return to the Qualtrics survey and continue completing questionnaires, only
to return to the MSCEIT publisher’s website for a second time, and then back to Qualtrics again.
Thus, in order to avoid attrition, the procedure was carefully planned to maximize the likelihood
that individuals would complete the entire study. That being said, it is possible there were biases
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introduced. In future studies, researchers may benefit from creating a procedure that allows for
counterbalancing (e.g., a completely in-lab study).
The fifth consideration is also related to the study’s methodology. It is possible that some
of the associations that were hypothesized were not found due to the motivated faking
instructions not being optimally effective. Day and Carroll (2008) instructed participants to
imagine they were applying for a Peer Counsellor position and to respond to the measures in
their study as though they were applying for the job. They also announced that $50 would be
awarded to the individuals that performed the best (an element of their design that involved
deception because there was, in actuality, no competition and the $50 was awarded to two
participants selected at random). The present study differed in two ways: participants were asked
to answer a series of prompts/questions that helped them imagine in some detail their own dream
job and then to complete the EI measures a second time in a way that they felt would increase
their chances of securing that dream job, while still being believable. Participants were not
offered the chance to ‘win’ $50 and no element of deception was employed because it was
thought possible to induce motivated faking without mention of a financial competition that was
not authentic; the significant difference found between the honest and motivated faking
conditions for trait EI suggests this effort was at least somewhat successful. Nevertheless, it may
not have been motivating enough for some participants. In future studies, researchers should
consider conditions such as the one employed in the present study and also ones that include
monetary rewards to motivate participants to fake their responses.
A sixth area to consider is malingering. This was not an area explored in the present
study, but it is related to emotional manipulation or using emotional information to get what one
wants. There is also a literature related to criminal defendants and malingering (e.g., Kucharski,

77

Toomey, Fila, & Duncan, 2007; Young, Jacobson, Einzig, Gray & Gudjonsson, 2016). As
mentioned above, individuals with Cluster B disorders are overrepresented in prison populations;
it may be illuminating to explore the nature of malingering in individuals with Cluster B
disorders and how this is associated with domains of EI. Related to this consideration, it will be
important to undertake research with clinical and community samples. Moving beyond an
undergraduate sample would permit a more focused consideration of comorbid psychological
disorders. Further, it may be beneficial to extend this research to similar constructs in children.
Although personality disorders in children is a controversial topic, they can be diagnosed in older
adolescents (APA, 2013; Links, Gould, & Ratnayake, 2003) and there are domains related to the
overlapping underlying characteristics (i.e., dramatic, erratic, emotionally dysregulated) that
apply to disorders and emotional/behavioural difficulties in childhood (e.g., conduct disorder,
oppositional defiant disorder, antisocial behaviours, emotion dysregulation, suicidal behaviour).
Future studies should focus on the exploration of the relationship between domains of EI and
these types of traits and behavioural tendencies, while taking faking into account (in the context
of development and other pertinent factors such as early childhood experiences, environment,
genetics; Forgatch & Gewirtz, 2017). For example, Westbrook and Berenbaum (2017) conducted
a study in which they found that emotional attention helped explain the relationship between
child abuse and the development of BPD, suggesting EI as a mediating variable.
Summary and Implications
Due to the limited literature in this area, more research is needed, but some of the main
findings reported in the present study are consistent with previous research, and advance the field
with added novel findings. The present findings support a significant negative relationship
between Cluster B personality disorder traits, specifically ASPD, BPD, and NPD, and both trait
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and ability EI, regardless of the capacity to fake EI. There are treatment implications. Improving
EI has the potential to help address behaviours that are characteristic of individuals with Cluster
B traits, whether it is informally teaching clients about emotional awareness and regulation or
formal EI skills training.
There are multiple evidence-based therapies that are specific to each Cluster B disorder
(Caligor, Levy, & Yeomans, 2015), but teaching EI skills could be included in multiple areas of
therapy, in order to enhance treatment effects. For example, when conducting dialectical
behaviour therapy (DBT), there is a focus on emotions in general, but also more specifically,
emotion regulation, interpersonal effectiveness, and distress tolerance (Linehan, 2015). Emotion
regulation is a central area of skill development in DBT. There is great emphasis placed on the
importance of understanding and naming emotions as a first step, then moving to changing,
reducing vulnerability to, and managing negative or extreme emotions. Another main aspect of
DBT is improving interpersonal effectiveness, or in other words, learning to manage
interpersonal conflicts proficiently and build healthy relationships. Linehan (2015) also outlines
distress tolerance as an essential part of DBT. This aspect of DBT teaches clients to refrain from
impulsiveness, how to self-soothe, and how to accept the situation. Many of these concepts and
target areas are overlapping with the construct of EI (e.g., understanding emotions, managing
emotions, establishing satisfying relationships). Given the relationships between Cluster B
disorders and EI, as discussed in the present study, and these overlapping features, DBT is
supported as a promising method of psychotherapy to treat Cluster B disorders.
Cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) is another area of treatment relevant to the
relationship between EI and Cluster B disorders (Beck & Freeman, 2015). Emotion is part of the
CBT model, in which thoughts, behaviours, and emotions all interact, and clients work on

79

changing thoughts and behaviours will, in turn, improve emotions. One main area of CBT is
creating dysfunctional thought records, in which clients need to name emotions they were feeling
in specific situations and rate the intensity of those emotions. These dysfunctional thought
records help clients recognize why they feel a particular way and what they can do to change it.
Other areas of CBT, specifically relating to personality disorders, that link closely with EI are
working to improve coping skills to avoid impulsivity, as well as problem solving (e.g., skill
training, pros and cons list) to help with a variety of areas (e.g., interpersonal relationships).
Again, there are many components of CBT for individuals with personality disorders that relate
back to EI (e.g., understanding emotions, building satisfying relationships, managing emotions).
As such, the findings from the present study support the use of CBT to treat individuals with
Cluster B disorders, as well as highlights the importance that clients with Cluster B disorders
have developed adequate awareness and understanding of emotions in order to participate
effectively in CBT.
Finally, emotion-focused therapy (EFT) is another clinically-relevant topic related to the
relationship between EI and Cluster B disorders. Two core features of EFT are accessing and
responding to adaptive emotional experiences and promoting the client’s experiences of attention
to and exploration of emotions (Paivio, 2013). In other words, two main focuses of EFT are
improving self-related difficulties, such as poor self-awareness, and exploring and reflecting on
the meaning of one’s internal experience (e.g., emotions, beliefs, desires). Once again, there are
connections between the relationship between EI and Cluster B disorders and EFT. Aspects of EI
(e.g., self-awareness, understanding emotions) lend themselves as points of foci in EFT. As such,
EFT is an important consideration when planning treatment for individuals with Cluster B
disorders and whether or not these areas of focus are promising for these individuals.
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Additionally, if an individual with a Cluster B disorder is participating in EFT, the clinician must
be aware of the deficits the client could have in these areas of EI, and work on specifically
monitoring and improving them.
Additionally, as individuals with Cluster B disorders also had specific EI patterns, this
adds an extra layer of understanding and a potential additional aid in detection of the Cluster B
disorders (Biskin, 2015; Sinclair & Feigenbaum, 2012). For example, BPD can be difficult to
diagnose and is comorbid with a variety of disorders. The knowledge of specific EI patterns
could be beneficial in identifying BPD. Likewise, NPD has various presentations of the
disorder, thus it can be difficult to diagnose (Caligor et al., 2015). Again, EI is not a part of the
diagnostic criteria of NPD, but the specific pattern of EI associated with NPD traits could be a
helpful preliminary screener for relevant difficulties for clinicians.
More specifically relating to childhood, although personality disorders are not diagnosed
in children, children do have traits that are indicative of later development of personality
disorders or have traits that resemble those of individuals that have personality disorders
(Bleiberg, 2002). In addition to similar treatment implications, perhaps if taught EI skills early
on in school, the development of a Cluster B disorder could be mitigated (Petrides et al., 2011;
Sinclair & Feigenbaum, 2012). For example, Finlon et al. (2015) conducted a study in which
they explored the effects of the Emotion-Based Prevention Program, which is designed as a
prevention program to develop social and emotional skills in children ages 3 to 5. They found
that in classrooms where this intervention was implemented, children developed more
knowledge of emotions, had fewer instances of expressing negative emotions, and had fewer
internalizing difficulties. Again, the parallels with EI features are evident (e.g., emotional
awareness and understanding, emotion regulation). Further, they also found that this intervention
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was effective even when children experienced more stress and/or less support, which may be the
case in children that have Cluster B related traits.
The present study also confirms previous findings in the literature indicating that it is not
possible to fake ability EI scores or, at the very least, it is more difficult to do so. This finding
has implications for the development of EI measures. Although the EQ-i:S and the MSCEIT are
both well-validated measures (Bar-On, 2002; Parker, Keefer, & Wood, 2011; Mayer et al.,
2003), participants in the present study demonstrated that they could fake EQi:S scores but not
MSCEIT scores, which speaks to reliability and validity. In future measure development work,
maximum performance tests would appear to be preferable when faking (whether in forensic or
industrial/organization psychology contexts) might or should be anticipated. The issue of being
able to fake when responding, is, of course, a concern across self-report measures, not just trait
EI measures (see, for example, Birkeland et al., 2006; Hartman & Grubb, 2011).
In employment/human resources contexts, in which EI assessments are undertaken for
personnel selection (Day and Carroll, 2008), a maximum performance test, like the MSCEIT,
may be preferable. Day and Carroll (2008) raised the issue of fairness when utilizing EI
measures that can be faked. Not only is fairness in question, however. There are many broader
implications (e.g., general productivity, team cohesiveness) that also need to be taken into
consideration. For instance, if an individual artificially increases their EI score, they may appear
to be someone who works well under pressure and gets along well with others. If, in actuality,
this is not the case, said individual could get behind in their work, submit subpar work, or disrupt
group cohesiveness, and therefore, the project(s) on which the group works.
It would also be beneficial for future work to explore other explanations for why
individuals fake responses on EI measures. The present study, along with previous findings, have
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supported that honest EI scores and social desirability response biases predict faked EI scores,
but it would be beneficial to determine what accounts for the other portion of the variance of
faked EI scores. Perhaps this blank could be filled in by individuals who use emotional
manipulation (Austin et al., 2007). It is characteristic of Cluster B disorders to be exploitative or
manipulative in order to attain a certain result (e.g., avoiding abandonment, personal gain), thus,
perhaps an aspect of this manipulation can partially account for faking. Further, Dunning et al.
(2004) found that, generally with self-report, but also more specifically self-report EI, there may
be systematic biases built into the measurement. For example, there may be consistent
differences in EI self-reports based on overall level of cognitive ability or level of education. As
aforementioned, the present study did account for this potential bias. Although both verbal and
nonverbal ability were positively associated with ability EI, they did not account for a significant
amount of variance of faked EI once honest EI was added to the model. This should be
considered when reviewing literature that did not account for this potential bias, as well as when
designing future studies. Again, the paradox Roberts et al., (2010) highlighted is of importance to
consider. If individuals who have low self-awareness complete a self-report EI measure, their
responses may not be valid.
Alexithymia is also relevant when considering valid responding on EI measures.
Alexithymia is characterized by difficulties identifying emotions and distinguishing between
emotions and bodily sensations, difficulties expressing emotions, limited imagination, and
having a literal and external way of thinking (Taylor & Bagby, 2000). Based on what Roberts et
al. (2010) proposed, individuals with alexithymia would likely not produce valid EI scores, as
they are characterized by a lack of EI, thus, a lack of emotional awareness. Contrary to this line
of thought, however, Parker et al. (2001) and Grabe et al. (2004) established patterns of
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associations between alexithymia and EI, and alexithymia and psychopathology, that indicated a
negative relationship between alexithymia and EI, and a positive relationship between
alexithymia and psychopathology. These patterns of associations are theoretically sound, but
given the paradox introduced by Roberts et al. (2010), one must consider how individuals with a
lack of emotional awareness were able to accurately respond to self-report measures regarding
their own behaviours and emotions. Thus, future work should also consider, and make an effort
to include, a measure of alexithymia and/or individuals diagnosed with alexithymia.
Another factor that could be taken into account when evaluating self-report EI scores, as
well as maximum performance test EI scores, is cultural differences. Not only does culture affect
emotional adjustment and well-being, defining characteristics of a culture (e.g., individualistic
vs. collectivistic), affect one’s perspective of emotions (Fernández-Berrocal, Salovey, Vera,
Extremera, & Ramos, 2005). Again, these factors may influence the way in which individuals
from a specific cultural background respond to EI measures, and may introduce a level of
systematic error if all individuals from a specific cultural background respond in the same way.
This is an area in need of focused research.
Finally, the post hoc analyses from the present study have implications for future research
in the area, and directly, the continuation of this study. Previous research has not been conducted
using the EQ-i:S and MSCEIT that provided enough information to advance hypotheses specific
to the specific subscales of EI. The findings from the present study demonstrate that there are
patterns of significant associations, warranting the continuation of research in this area. These
preliminary data provide a basis for hypotheses regarding the relationships between both trait
and ability EI subscales and Cluster B disorders. A potential path analysis model has been
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created, for both trait and ability EI, based on the findings of the post hoc analyses from the
present study (Appendix B).
The promise of further work on the interface between maladaptive personality traits and
EI is, indeed, considerable.
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Appendix A
Faking Condition Instructions
A few moments ago you completed a measure of how you think about, understand, and
manage emotions. You may recall that you completed a questionnaire that also concerned
emotions when you participated in the online questionnaire part of this study (don’t worry if you
don’t remember though!). Now we would like you to complete both measures again here in the
lab. But this time we are NOT asking you to complete the measures as honestly as you can.
Instead, we would like for you to respond in a way that makes yourself look as good as possible
while still being believable.
We want you to imagine you are applying for your dream job. In this imaginary scenario,
the person making the decision about whether you get your dream job will be using your
responses to the two measures to decide if you have the characteristics and skills they want.
Please complete the measures as though you are the ideal candidate for the job and try to make
sure your responses on the measures make you look ideal while still being believable. Before you
start on the measures again, please complete the following to make sure you have your ideal job
firmly in mind (we won’t keep this information – it is just to get you thinking):

What type of job is this ideal job? Does it have a title?

What kind of tasks will you be doing? _______________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
In what type of location will you be doing most of your work?

Will you be in charge of other people? If so, how many? _______________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
How much money will you be paid per year? _________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________

So, you really want this dream job, right? Now complete the two measures again and make sure
your responses make you look great while still being believable.
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Appendix B
Figure 3. Proposed Associations between Trait EI Subscales and Cluster B Personality Disorder
Traits

Note. INTRA = Intrapersonal ability EQ-i:S subscale; INTER = Interpersonal ability EQ-i:S
subscale; STRESS = Stress Management EQ-i:S subscale; ADAPT = Adaptability EQ-i:S
subscale; MOOD = General Mood EQ-i:S subscale; ASPD = Antisocial Personality Disorder;
BPD = Borderline Personality Disorder; HPD = Histrionic Personality Disorder; NPD =
Narcissistic Personality Disorder
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Figure 4. Proposed Associations between Ability EI Subscales and Cluster B Personality
Disorder Traits

Note. Perceive = Perceiving Emotions MSCEIT subscale; Facilitate Thought = Facilitating
Thought MSCEIT subscale; Understand = Understanding Emotions MSCEIT subscale; Manage
= Managing Emotions MSCEIT subscale ASPD = Antisocial Personality Disorder; BPD =
Borderline Personality Disorder; HPD = Histrionic Personality Disorder; NPD = Narcissistic
Personality Disorder
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